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Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 1942 (1 viewing) (1) Guest
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TOPIC: Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 1942
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Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 4 Weeks ago
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I am researching the actions by the Western and Kalinin Fronts against the German 9th Army in the Rzhev salient beginning 25 November 1942 known as Operation MARS.
In particular, I am trying to determine the strength of various Soviet units involved in the fight. One Russian source I have found states that Soviet tank and mechanized corps were roughly equal in strength to a German Panzer division. He also states that a frontline Soviet rifle division at this point in the war numbered on average approximately 5000 to 7000 men (strength on paper was approximately 12,000). I understand that as the war progressed, Soviet units in combat did not receive large numbers of replacements, that instead new men went to form new units, and that Soviet divisions in 1945 frequently were no larger than 1200-1500 men. But was this true for those forces built up around Moscow in early 1942?
This same source argues that Operation MARS - the attack on 9th Army - was a diversion intended to fix German reserves in place so that they were not dispatched to reinforce von Manstein's efforts to releive 6th Army at Stalingrad.
Any thoughts, comments, or additional resources I could pursue?
I have read David Glantz extensively, but I am looking for a Russian history to balance my sources (either to support or contradict Glantz).
Thanks - âû
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Re:Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 4 Weeks ago
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Glantz draws heavily on Soviet sources so his accounts of the combat operations are unlikely to differ from a ‘Russian history’. Perhaps where accounts differ is in the strategic context of the operation. There has been much debate about whether Mars was a major offensive in its own right and perhaps even the major offensive of the winter (as Glantz claims) or undertaken largely as a diversion for Uranus. Official Soviet histories of the war certainly portrayed the fighting at Velikie Luki and around the Rzhev salient in November and December 1942 not as a coordinated offensive but rather as a disparate set of diversionary operations to tie down German forces in Army Group Centre in order to prevent their redeployment to the Stalingrad axis where they might have compromised the success of Operation Uranus. This may have been the effect of Operation Mars but it was not the primary intent. The two operations, Mars and Uranus, were complementary but each had a specific strategic objective. The primary objective of Operation Mars was to eliminate the Belyi/Rzhev/Sychevka salient by encircling and destroying IX Army. The simultaneity of Uranus and Mars was designed to prevent OKH from switching reserves between the two axes in a manner that would allow it to deal with the Soviet offensives sequentially. Operation Mars was on the same scale as Operation Uranus and Soviet personnel losses in Operation Mars were considerably higher than those in Operation Uranus. Measured in those terms, and the fact that very little territory was gained, Operation Mars represented a considerable strategic offensive effort by the Red Army and a not inconsiderable defeat.
At the end of 1942 a definitive organisational arrangement was issued for a rifle division of around 9,500 personnel. In practice this level of manning was not generally achieved and divisional strengths of 7,000 were not uncommon even at the start of a campaign.
Initially tank corps had an establishment strength of little more than 5,500 men with 20 heavy tanks, 40 medium tanks and 40 light tanks (the corps were to consist of two tank brigades and a genuinely motorised rifle brigade with more than 300 trucks). This puts the early tank corps at around half the strength of a fully manned, fully equipped panzer division. In fact panzer divisions were not generally at full strength (though neither were tank corps). Mechanised corps were more powerful than tank corps; they included slightly more tanks but more importantly incorporated within their component mechanised brigades a better balance of forces, particularly with regard to motorised infantry, to seize and hold objectives deep in the German rear. Each mechanised corps had three mechanised brigades, comparable to the motorised rifle brigades but with the inclusion in each of a tank regiment. From the beginning the mechanised corps of more than 15,000 personnel, 200 tanks, 50 heavy mortars, 36 anti-tank guns, 36 field guns and 8 Katyusha (BM-13) rocket launchers were comparable to panzer divisions.
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Re:Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 3 Weeks ago
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Thanks Keith.
My problem with Glantz's "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" is that, although it is very well and extensively researched, he seems to draw conclusions as to what Zhukov and others were thinking at the time, or even spoke quietly to themselves. While it could be gleaned from journals or letters, or even eyewitness accounts... it strikes me as a little too much "poetic license."
As far as Operation Mars being a diversion, the reason that I don't buy that is that it came a week after Uranus was launched. If it was indeed a diversion, the von Kluge had already demonstrated that the mere threatened activites of the Kalinin and Western fronts were enough to freeze his reserves in place. Two days after Vasilevsky's forces had linked up at Kalach, when Zhukov's assault on the Rzhev salient was launched, the German reserves had not been released to the south. That being the case, why do more at Rzhev than continue to threaten, fire massive artillery concentrations, and conduct numerous "reconnaissance in force" missions? The effect would have been the same - German reserves would have continued to be held to counter that threat. Partisan activities in the area a the time were enough to warn the Soviets when and if the German reserves started moving -- so launch the assault then, when the reserves started moving south. Place the Germans in a dilemma where they were forced to react, choosing one action over another. It could well be conducted at a much smaller cost in men and materiel.
Of course, I have the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. But it sure seems that Zhukov was desperately trying to pump too many forces into and through the Vazusa bridgehead for the operation to just be a diversion.
In my opinion, Mars failed because the Pogoreloe – Gorodische offensive of August 1942 allowed the Ninth Army to improve their defenses and defensive plans prior to the November offensive. While they too had suffered horrendous casulaties during the fighting in August, they learned from the experience and improved both positions and tactics. They improved interior roads and lines of communications, as well as defensive plans. They cut trees to both improve maneuver inside the salient (in order to allow the relatively quick movement of reserves) and also to open fields of fire. They had been warned, and they took the warning seriously. Another issue is, it appears that Zhukhov might have become somewhat fixated on Ninth Army and Army Group Center, to the point that he failed to see the bigger picture around him.
Just my thoughts.
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I asked about "Russian History" instead of "Soviet History" because, in my mind, the two are different. Glantz is relying on recently declassified Soviet archives ("Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" was published in 1999), but even as recently as August 2000, newspapers such as Tverskaia zhizn were publishing articles that challenged the strategic significance of the Rzhev battles of November 1942. I guess it's "official" history versus "popular" history. Kind of like how in the last 10 years we've learned that the lessons taught to us (in the U.S.) in the 1970s about the Soviets were incredibly inaccurate and biased.
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Re:Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 3 Weeks ago
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I suppose any author should be wary about trying to explain the thought processes of a historical figure. Memoirs are notoriously untrustworthy sources and even in verbatim accounts of planning conferences etc. an individual may not express his true thoughts. Nonetheless Zhukov ‘did what he did’ and not without reason, so it’s not unreasonable to try to discern the thinking behind the action.
I agree, for the reasons I cited earlier, that Mars was not a diversion. One thing to remember though is that Mars began much later than originally planned (probably because of the weather), and that gives greater credibility to those who argue that it had been intended as a diversion.
The operation failed, but in places it was close-run thing. I think Zhukov should be criticised, not for trying (Rzhev was still a dagger pointing at Moscow), but for failing to recognise failure earlier than he did.
As for ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russian’ history, I tend to use the term Soviet because, though it was a predominantly Russian effort, there were many non-Russians involved and the war was between Germany and the Soviet Union.
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Re:Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 3 Weeks ago
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Mars and Uranus both were launched later than planned due primarily to weather and logistical related issues.
The November Rzhev battles were indeed a close run affair, from the Vazusa bridgehead to the fighting in the Luchesa River Valley, along the Nacha and around Belyi. The more I study about Mars and the August Rzhev battles, the more I tend to believe that Zhukov was fixated on the destruction of Army Group Center.
Yes, the Germans in the Rzhev salient (and the Demyansk salient) were a threat to Moscow – or at least those positions could be used as a jumping off point for any renewed drive on Moscow. So Zhukov and Stavka should have been concerned, and should have taken appropriate steps to eliminate the threat. Both operationally and strategically, Operation Mars made sense.
The three main thrusts of Mars – the attack of the Western Front’s 20th Army across the Vazusa River and the attacks of the Kalinin Front’s 41st Army south of Belyi and the 22nd Army up the Luchesa River valley were a viable enough plan – as was the “diversionary” assault of the 30th and 39th Armies on the northern flank of the salient. These assaults had the Ninth Army hanging by a thread by the end of the day on 25 November.
Zhukov was too impatient for victory. He should have allowed for the expansion of the Vazusa bridgehead before committing too many forces across the river. As it was, military traffic was jammed on the few roads leading into the bridgehead which not only delayed the advance of combat forces, prevented resupply of fuel and ammunition, and allowed the quickly advancing 6th Tank Corps to outrun the range of Soviet artillery – it also presented lucrative targets to the German artillery.
The renewed attacks across the entire frontage on 26 and 27 November did little to aid the overall operation. German lines were holding and reserves were arriving. Additional infantry and combat power should have been allocated to reducing strongpoints at the Vazusa bridgehead – then the 6th Tank Corps could have advanced with adequate infantry. Too many of their tanks were destroyed at extremely close range by German infantry with grenade bundles and explosive satchels. Soviet infantry in sufficient strength advancing with the tanks could have prevented many of these losses.
While 41st Army did attack Ninth Army’s “Romanians” (the 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division), the rest of the defenses in the salient were far different from those encountered with the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies in the south. Army Group Center had reserves relatively close by, and in the wake of the August Rzhev battles, AGC and Ninth Army had improved interior lines of communication to allow for rapid movement of mechanized and motorized reserves – and they had cleared fields of fire in the depths of the salient in order to counter penetrations.
Nonetheless, the overall battle was closely fought. But for the want of artillery support in 20th Army’s sector and improved mobile logistics (fuel, ammunition, and maintenance) Mars could well have succeeded, Army Group Center could have collapsed, and the war could have perhaps ended earlier.
Zhukov’s plan was sound and audacious – but the combat service support elements of the Red Army weren’t as mature and capable as the combat forces, and therefore the assault couldn’t be maintained. That was, in my opinion, the primary shortcoming of the operation. Trucks and traffic control aren’t the exciting parts of history, but too many campaigns have halted short of their objectives because support couldn’t be delivered where and when needed.
Just my opinions.
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Re:Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 2 Weeks ago
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You have clearly studied the battle in some detail. In comparison with the situation on the Don/Volga, at Rzhev Zhukov was facing forces determined to resist, and forces that, having anticipated the offensive for weeks, had made all necessary preparations (strongpoints, fire plans, supply, reserves, internal mobility etc).
I agree with you about the vital nature of the less than glamorous logistic support and of the detailed staff work behind it. It was to be another nine months before the Red Army could claim to have fully mastered the complex business breaking fixed German defences and conducting successful follow-up deep penetration offensives.
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RE: Actions around Rzhev and Viaz'ma November 19425 Months, 2 Weeks ago
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Operation "Mars" is one of the least known in the history of WWII.
I have enough talks about it on my forum, but it resulted in resuming the number of original documents, opened in Russian archives for this operation is not enough for giving clear description of what had happened there. From one side it was operation for holding of German forces in the salient preventing from their transfer to Stalingrad direction. From the other side the amount of forces involved in this battle were compatible with those, used for the Stalingrad offensive. The results were incompatible.
Finally after hot disputes we agreed that Soviet side couldn't fulfill its strategic aims on this direction, but managed to tie part of German forces in that area didn't let them make help to the surrounded Stalingrad group.
My friend, who directly worked with archival documents for this operation says, that we never learn all the truth about it. The numbers of killed, missed, wounded soldiers can vary in large limits. He says during excavations in that area they found soldiers from units, which couldn't be found there by documents. They had no ideas in what they they could be redeployed in that area...
Regards
Alex
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