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О применении противником отравляющих веществ, 1941 г.

2009-09-25T06:41:43Z

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Report About Operations Of The 71st Indep. Guards Heavy Tank Regt, 14 July - 31 August 1944

2005-09-25T21:18:06Z

REPORT ABOUT OPERATIONS OF THE 71ST INDEPENDENT GUARDS HEAVY TANK REGIMENT FROM 14 JULY TO 31 AUGUST 1944

In the morning of 13 August 1944, the Regiment, in cooperation with 289th Infantry Regiment of 97th Infantry Division began an advance towards Oglendov. The enemy tanks, which were on the outskirts, blocked the infantry attack. At that moment, the tank platoon of Guards Senior Lieutenant Klimenkov was advancing from his previously prepared position and opened fire on the enemy tanks. As a result, after a short engagement, Klimenkov destroyed one tank and damaged another (these were the first King Tiger's to be destroyed) and the infantry entered Ogledov without facing any serious resistance.

Simultaneously, from the height 272.1, seven King Tigers attacked our positions. Concealed in the bushes to the east of Mokree, the tank of Guards Senior Lieutenant Udalov let the enemy approach within 700-800 metres and then opened fire on the leading tank. After several accurate shots, one tank was destroyed and another one damaged. When the enemy started to retreat, Udalov drove his tank along the forest road towards the enemy and, from the edge of the forest, opened fire again. Leaving one more tank on fire, the enemy retreated.

Soon, the King Tigers attacked again. This time they were advancing towards Ponik, where the Guards Lieutenant Beliakov's was in laying in ambush. He opened fire from the distance of 1000 metres. By the third round, he had set fire to one tank and forced others to retreat.

During the day the tankers, in co-operation with artillery, repulsed 7 armored attacks and inflicted heavy human and technical losses on the enemy.

Enemy losses from 14 July to 31 August 1944

Burnt out:
Tiger - 4,
King Tiger - 4,
Panther - 3,
Ferdinand self-propelled gun - 1,
128mm self-propelled gun - 1,
Armored cars - 3.

Damaged:
Tiger - 1,
King Tiger - 2,
Panther - 3.

Guns destroyed of different calibres: 23,
Machine-guns destroyed: 22,
Soldiers and officers killed: 600.

Regimental losses:

JS-122’s destroyed - 3.
JS-122’s damaged - 7. (Three were repaired by the Regiment and four were sent for rebuilding by the Repair Center.)

Killed In Action:
Officers - 3, These included the Regimental Commander Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Judin,
sergeants and solders - 10.

Wounded:
Officers - 8,
Sergeants and privates - 36.

The experience showed that the tanks could have an effective range of 70-100 kilometres per day, with an average speed on roads of 20-25 km/h and 10-15 km/h across country. A maximum range is about 125-150 kilometres. In total, the tanks covered about 1100 kilometres, therefore tank engines worked for 250-270 moto-hours while guaranteed 150 moto-hours.

The actual speed across country on the battlefield reaches 8-12 km/h. The guns could fire 2-3 rounds a minute. During an offensive, the number of rounds carried for a main armament is sufficient for the one day's combat.

In general, the conditions for fire and observation from a tank are satisfactory.

In practice, the 9T-17 telescopic sight was found to be uncomfortable for the gunner when shooting and observing, because it did not permit 360 traverse through the turret roof. It could also not be used because of difficulties relating to adjustment and inability to keep track of the target.

The existing cast armour could be penetrated by 88 mm round from a distance of 800-1000 metres, because of bad quality of our armor (e.g. insufficient thickness, bubbles).

Conclusions:

1. The main armament of the JS-122 remains the most powerful of all existing types of tanks. The 122 mm round has great armor-piercing capability and this makes these tanks the best solution against other heavy enemy tanks.

2. The large quantity of smoke from the gun when fired reveals the tank’s position.

3. The experience of defensive combat in the bridgehead, revealed that enemy tanks avoid areas defended by JS-122's. As a result, this situation often results in a change of the attack's direction, looking for the less well defended areas.

71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment Commander
Guards Lieutenant-Colonel
Shapar'

Translated by: Alexandre Khokhriakov
Proof-read by: Chris Amundson
Sources: "M-Hobby" #4, 1999

Report About The Combat Actions Of 563rd IndepTBn

2005-09-25T21:15:53Z

REPORT ABOUT THE COMBAT ACTIONS OF 563rd IndepTBn

Top Secret

Copy #1

8 March 1943

To the Chief of Staff, KU BTMV SKF [North Caucasus Front -Valera P.]

To the Chief of Operations Section the staff of ChGV [Black Sea Group of Forces], North Caucasus Front

Herein I present a summary regarding the combat actions of the tank units of the Black Sea Group of Forces, North Caucasus Front for February-March 1943.

APPENDIXES:

1. Summary of combat actions in 17 pages
2. Sketch of combat actions of tank units in 5 pages [scetch is missed]

CHIEF OF STAFF UK BTMV ChGV SKF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL /FEDOROVICH/

APPENDIX

563 IndepTBn

The battalion was part of the group of Colonel Gordeev. Over the course of January [1943] it was prepared for amphibious landing operations and deployed to GELENDZHIK. The battalion was equipped with 30 M3L tanks. [M3L is Soviet designation for US M3 "General Stuart" Light Tank -Valera P.]

On the night from 2 to 3.2.43 the battalion was loaded on three Bolinders (10 tanks and 2 GAZ trucks on each Bolinder) and at 21:00 on 3.2 departed on the course: GELENDZHIK BAY-shore of Southern OZEREYKA.

At 02:00 on 4.2.43 two towed Bolinders reached the shore of Southern OZEREYKA.

These Bolinders were fired upon by enemy artillery.

The Bolinders attempted to disembark their tanks. The tanks were unloaded directly into the water under enemy fire. The second Bolinder managed to unload 7 tanks. One Bolinder was unable to unload because the gangway received a direct hit from an artillery shell. Tanks were set on fire and the burning Bolinder was abandoned by its crew and the infantry. These personnel landed on the shore and occupied a defense in accordance with an order of Major KUZMIN, the commander of 142nd Battalion.

The 7 tanks that had disembarked from the first Bolinder, with their assigned desantniki, and infantry under the command of Captain AGEEV conducted an attack on Southern OZEREYKA, Northern OZEREYKA, and approached the outskirts of the village GLEBOVKA.

On 4.2.43 it became known that the enemy had occupied Southern OZERYKA and the tanks under the command of Captain AGEEV had become cut off from our own forces.

Contact with the remaining group of landed forces was not reestablished.

By the end of the day on 4.2.43, contact was established with aviation, which had dropped a message by pouch to attempt to reach Cape KhAKO-STANICHKA.

The infantry commander with whom the tanks were operating (whose name cannot be determined) decided to attempt to reach STANICHKA. The tanks had expended their fuel and were unable to move under their own power. The crews removed the machine guns from the tanks, disabled them, and together with the infantry at 02:00 on 5.2.43 moved to STANICHKA.

The third Bolinder, during its approach to shore, was dropped from tow and moving by inertia stopped some 30-40 meters from the shore. The unloading of the tanks directly into the water was begun. Seven tanks were able to disembark safely. Three tanks died [drowned, perhaps] during movement in the water and only five tanks reached the shore. Along with the infantry under the command of the commander, 140th Battalion, these tanks began to fight off the counterattack of the enemy from Southern OZEREYKA.

Over the course of 4, 5, and 6 February, the tanks and infantry continued to fight. No reinforcement came from the air or sea.

The infantry and tanks were in a critical situation.

Seeing the hopeless situation, the commander of 140th Battalion, 255th KMBR gave an order to disable their serviceable tanks, remove their machine guns, and together with his battalion attempt to reach friendly forces. (The tanks had no fuel and thus could not be used.)

The tank crews joined the rifle battalion and began to move in the direction of Lake ABRAU.

Having reached the vicinity of ABRAU-DYURSO, this group fell under the fire of the garrison of Germans and Romanians. Not accepting combat, the group split into small groups and in unorganized small groups began to withdraw in various directions.

During the period of the combat actions 563rd IndepTBn suffered the following losses: set fire by enemy tanks -7 vehicles; rendered unserviceable by own crews -23 M3L tanks.

Losses in personnel: did not return from the area of combat actions-command personnel -45 persons; enlisted and junior supervisory personnel -96 persons.

Notes: The style of the original document is preserved.

Translated by: James F. Gebhardt
Sources: "Tankomaster" #1, 1999