1. Among these many histories, only that of John Erickson mentions Soviet plans for an expanded offensive against Army Group Center. A particularly perceptive German account also detected the ultimate Soviet plan for an expanded strategic offensive in February 1943. See Generalleutnant a. D. A.D. von Plato, Die Geschichte der 5. Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945 [The History of 5th Panzer Division from 1938 to 1945], (Regensburg: Walhalla u, Praetoria Verlag KG Georg Zwickenpflug, 1978).
2. For an account of the Donbas and Khar'kov operations, see David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd, 1991). Among the few candid Soviet accounts of the Khar'kov and Donbas operations are V. P. Morozov, Zapadnee voronezha [West of Voronezh], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956) and A. G. Ershov, Osvobozhdenie donbassa [The liberation of the Donbas], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973). The extensive, recently released Soviet archival collections prepared during and after the war by the Soviet General Staff mention neither of the operations. Nor does this material cover the expanded February offensive in any detail.
3. On 5 July 1942, the Soviet 5th Tank Army spearheaded an unsuccessful offensive by the Bryansk Front to halt the German drive to the Don River. Although open source accounts limit this action to 5-12 July, the attack intensified in late July. For details, see "Boevye deistviia voisk Bryanskogo i Voronezhskogo frontov letom 1942 na voronezhkom napravlenii" [Combat actions of Bryansk and Voronezh Front forces in Summer 1942 on the Voronezh direction], in the formerly classified Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War], Vol. 15 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1955), pp. 115-46. Classified secret. Declassified in 1964. On 27 July the Stavka issued the new plan, which called for a strategic offensive by the Bryansk, Voronezh, and Stalingrad Fronts from Elets in the north to Kotel'nikovo in the south, against Army Groups "B" and "A". This offensive involved simultaneous attacks by the reinforced 5th Tank Army west of Voronezh and the 1st, and 4th Tank Armies in the great bend of the Don River. For sketchy details, see S. Mikhalev, "O razrabotke zamysla i planirovanii kontrnastuleniia pod stalingradom" [About working out the concept and planning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive], Vestnik voennnoi informatsii [Herald of military information], #8 (August 1992), p. 7. German Second Army records underscore the massive nature of 5th Tank Army's attacks, which included corps commanded by such luminaries as Katukov, Rotmistrov, and Solomatin.
4. While SATURN was to follow URANUS, the precise code-name for the follow-on operation to MARS remains unknown. Presumably it was also named for a planet (JUPITER or NEPTUNE being the best candidates).
5. For an account of the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation, see Ershov and the formerly classified Soviet General Staff study, "Voronezhsko-kastornenskaia nastupatel'naia operatsiia voisk voronezhskogo i levogo kryla Bryanskogo frontov" [The Voronezh-Kastornoe offensive operation of forces of the Voronezh and left wing of the Bryansk fronts], Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 13 [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War, Issue 13], (Moscow: Military-historical Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, 1954). Classified secret. Declassified 1964.
6. The First Panzer Army was transferred from the Caucasus to Army Group Don beginning on 27 January, and the Fourth Panzer Army withdrew from Rostov to the Mius River line from 8-18 February. See Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), pp. 85, 88.
7. The Don Front's 57th Army soon became the 68th Army, which was activated in the Northwest Front in February 1943.
8. A. M. Vasilevsky, Delo vsei zhizni [A lifelong cause], (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), pp. 279-80. Detailed Stavka records on the planning of this operation have yet to be released from the russian archives. Based on materials already released, this account by Vasilevsky is correct, as far as it goes.
9. Ibid., pp. 282-283. See also K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 174.
10. Vasilevsky, Delo, pp. 283-284; S. M. Shtemenko, General'nyi shtab v gody voiny [The General Staff at War], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), pp. 107-08; K. F. Telegin, Voiny neschitannye versty [Uncounted versts of war], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), p. 173.
11. Vasilevsky, pp. 283-84.
12. Rokossovsky, pp. 175-76; see also, P. I. Batov, V pokhodakh i boiakh [In marches and battles], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), pp. 289-90.
13. The German Second Panzer Army's records indicate that the 48th Army forced the German 45th and 299th Infantry Divisions to abandon Droskovo (northeast of Maloiaroslavets) in heavy fighting between 8 and 12 February. By 17 February the 48th Army's forces, spearheaded by the 6th Guards and 399th Rifle Divisions, the 9th Ski Brigade, and the 43d Tank Regiment, had captured Pokrovskoe. The attack created a large salient in the German's defenses northwest of Pokrovskoe from which the 48th Army's forces threatened to cross the Neruch River and sever the Orel-Kursk railroad line in the rear of German forces defending Maloiaroslavets. However, by 22 February the Germans were able to contain the Soviet advance east of the Neruch River.
14. For accounts of the 13th, 60th, and 38th Armies' operations during this and subsequent periods, see V plameni srazhenii: boevoi put' 13-i armii [In the flames of battle: the combat path of 13th Army], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), pp. 84-88; A. Sharipov, Cherniakhovskii, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 185-95; and K. S. Moskalenko, Na iugo-zapadnom napravlenii, T .2 [On the southwestern direction, Vol. 2], (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969), pp. 397-451.
15. See "Considerations concerning the conduct of the 60th Army's L'gov-Ryl'sk operation," classified top secret, from. "Materialy po planirovaniiu i provedeniiu Voronezhskoi i L'govsko-Ryl'skoi nastupatel'noi operatsii 2. 1-18. 3. 43g" [Materials concerning the planning and conduct of the Voronezh and L'gov-Ryl'sk offensive operations, 2 January-18 March 1943]. TsAMO, F. 417, op. 10564, d. 256, ll. 63-65.
Cherniakhovsky's orders read:
1. The mission of the 60th Army is to destroy the opposing enemy and reach the Arbuzova Station, Studenok, Ryl'sk, and Snagost' line by 17 February 1943, having captured the cities of L'gov, Ryl'sk, and Korenevo. Deploy the army's grouping along [the following] line: the 248th Separate Rifle Brigade on the right flank from Arbuzova to Griady with the mission of protecting the army's right flank; a shock group consisting of the 322d, 121st, and 141st Rifle Divisions, the 129th Rifle Brigade, and the 150th Tank Brigade in the center from Studenok through Ryl'sk to (excluding) Korenevo with the mission to be prepared to attack either Glukhov or Putivl'; and the104th Separate Rifle Brigade with the 8th Destroyer Brigade on the left flank in the Korenevo and Snagost' region with the mission of protecting the army's left flank. The 14th Destroyer Brigade will be kept in reserve in the Suchkino region, in anticipation of being employed to consolidate success on the central axis. The 129th Rifle Division, which is approaching late, will be used to relieve the 141st Rifle Division on the designated line, and the latter will be withdrawn into reserve in the Ivanovskoe region.
2. The concept of the operation is to deliver the main attack in the general direction of L'gov-Ryl'sk, while avoiding any sort of complex regrouping and by using the existing army grouping as the jumping off position for the new operation.
3. The stages of the operation [are as follows]: 1st Stage (13-15. 2. 43) - the capture of L'gov and Shereki#The entire army will reach the St. Sokovninka, Konyshevka, Prilepy, Shirkovo, Kudintsevo, Sergeevka, Sherekino, Liubomorivka, Vyshnie Dereven'ki, Kromskie Byki, Anastas'evka, Khitrovka, Pogrebki, and Viktorovka front by the end of 15. 2. 43. The 2d Stage (16-17. 2. 43) - the capture of Ryl'sk and Korenevo. Having captured Ryl'sk, reach the Arbuzovo, Studenok, Ryl'sk, korenevo, and Snagost' line by the end of 17. 2.
Major General Krylov, the 60th Army chief of staff
16. For details of the 2d Tank Army's difficult march see "Operativnoe marshi tankovykh i mekhaninizirovannykh soedineniii" [The operational marches of tank and mechanized formations] in Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta voiny, #9 noiabr'-dekabr' 1943 g. [Collection of Materials for the Exploitation of War Experience, #9, November-December 1943], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1944), pp. 59-63.
17. For a detailed account of the 2d Tank Army's operations, see F. I. Vysotsky, M. E. Makukhin, F. M. Sarychev, M. K. Shaposhynikov, Gvardeiskaia tankovaia [Guards tank], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 15-23. Some Soviet sources state that the offensive began on 26 February. This disparity results from the fragmented nature of the attack.
18. I.H.Bagramyan, Tak shli my k pobede [As we went on to victory], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), pp. 371-78, details the 16th Army's operations from 22 February through late March. More details from the divisional level are found in V. Lobanov, Vosemnadtsataia gvardeiskaia [18th Guards], (Kaliningrad: Kaliningradskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1975), pp. 74-77 and P. G. Kuznetsov, Gvardeitsy-moskvichi [Guards-muscovites], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), pp. 190-93. Extensive Second Panzer Army records document the scope and intensity of Bagramian's effort. Sokolovsky replaced Konev on 28 February.
19. The 61st Army attacked in two sectors. The 12th Guards Rifle Division attacked north of Bolkhov but its attack failed immediately. Meanwhile, the 5th, 342d, 356th, and 283d Rifle Divisions seized a bridgehead from Chegodaevo to Gorodische east of Bolkhov and reinforced the bridgehead with the re-deployed 12th Guards Rifle Division. However, by 24 February the German 112th Infantry Division had contained the attack. Later, by 12 March, it counterattacked and eliminated the bridgehead. See also D. K. Mal'kov, Skvoz' dym i plamia [Through smoke and flames], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), pp. 61-62, a history of the 12th Guards Rifle Division, which provides a detailed assessment of why its assault failed.
20. The 5th Army employed its 29th Guards Rifle Division, 153d Rifle Brigade, and 153d Tank Brigade in this attack, which took place in a narrow sector northwest of Gzhatsk defended by the German 35th Infantry Division. Simultaneously, the 33d Army launched its attack southeast of Temkino with at least its 160th Rifle Division.
21. For details about Soviet conduct of the Donbas and Khar'kov operations, see David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr, (London: Frank Cass, 1991).
22. Here and elsewhere, I use the standard German Army roman numeral designation for German panzer corps numbered XXXX through XXXIX instead of XL through XLVI. The Germans used the former in their operational maps and records to avoid numerical confusion.
23. For operational and tactical detail regarding the disposition and actions of German forces throughout the operation, see Pz AOK 2, 37075/46, Chefkarten, 28 Anlagen, Anlagenband 33, Pz AOK 2, Ia, Lagenkarten 1.2.1943 - 28. 2. 1943, NAM T-313, Roll 171; Pz AOK 2, 37075/47, Chefkarten, 14 Anlagen, Pz AOK 2, Is, Lagenkarten 18. 3.1943 - 31. 3. 1943, NAM T-313, Roll 171; and AOK 2, 31811/2, Anlage zum Kriegstagebuch A. O. K. 2 - Ia, Russland Teil 9, Lagenkarten 1. Januar 1943 bis 31. Marz 1943, NAM T-312, Roll 1213. For German intelligence appreciations, see AOK 2, 31811/123, (no German title) Situation maps and overlays (1:300,000), prepared by the Second Army, Counter-intelligence Officer (Ic/AO), December 1942-July 1943, NAM T-312, Roll 1223. This intelligence material verifies the Soviet accounts of the operation and clearly indicates Soviet offensive intent.
24. For additional details of the 65th Army's operations throughout the entire period, see G. S. Nagysev, Na sluzhbe shtabnoi [In staff service], (Riga: Izdatel'stbo "Pissma", 1972), pp. 110-13; and I. N. Pavlov, Ot Moskby do Shtrol'zunda [From Moscow to Strasland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 45-47. The latter is a history of the 354th Rifle Division.
25. Batov, pp. 295-98. For coordination problems between 65th Army and 70th Army and for details of the 69th Rifle Division's operations, see A. A. Andreev, Po voennym dorogam [Along military roads], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 36-57. One of the few available accounts of the 70th Army's operations is from the perspective of the 102d Rifle Division found in A. M. Andreev, Ot pervogo mgnoveniia do poslednego [From the first moment to the last], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), pp. 70-76 and in the records of opposing German forces.
26. An account of the 194th Rifle Division's role in the operation is found in K. K. Shilov, Rechitskaia krasnoznamennaia [Rechitsa red banner], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), pp. 63-73.
27. For details of the 11th Tank Corps operations, see I. I. Iushchuk, Odinnadtsatyi tankovyi korpus v boiakh za rodinu [The 11th Tank Corps in battles for the fatherland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), pp. 18-27.
28. Originally, the only forces opposing the exploiting the 11th Tank Corps and Kriukov's cavalry were the Hungarian 104th and 108th Light [Jager] Division, which withdrew from Sevsk westward toward the Desna River.
29. For 21st Army's role in the operation, see Po prukazu Rodiny [By order of the fatherland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 68-75, and I. M. Chistiakov, Sluzhim otchizne [In the service of the fatherland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), pp. 130-37.
30. Originally, both the 62d and 64th Armies had probably been designated to reinforce the Soviet February offensive after they had completed refitting, either in Central Front's sector or elsewhere. They began their movements forward in late February and completed assembly by mid-March.
31. The 1st Tank Army had been formed near Ostashkov in the Northwestern Front's sector between 30 January and 23 February 1943 around the nucleus of the 29th Army's headquarters. Initially, it consisted of one tank corps (the 6th), one mechanized corps (the 3d), a separate tank brigade (the 112th), two guards airborne divisions (the 6th and 9th), six ski brigades, and several separate tank regiments. In mid-February it joined Lieutenant General F. I. Tolbukhin's 68th Army, itself a special assault army made up primarily of airborne divisions, to form Group Khozin. Khozin's group was designated as the exploitation force for a major Northwestern Front offensive, which was planned for late February against German Sixteenth Army. After exploiting the attack of the 1st Shock Army, Group Khozin was to seize Dno and exploit through Luga to the Baltic Sea to isolate the German Leningrad Group. However, on 23 February (9 March according to another source), it was alerted to move south, either to participate in offensive operations elsewhere (possibly the Western Front's Rzhev-Viaz'ma offensive of 2 March or the Central Front's offensive), or to help thwart von Manstein's counterstroke. Its main combat elements reached the Oboian region by 23 March. The fact that the Stavka intended to use this powerful force in a major offensive (code-named POLAR STAR) south of Leningrad further attests to ambitiousness of the Stavka's offensive planning in February 1943. For further details, see M. E. Katukov, Na ostrie glavnogo udara [On the point of the main attack], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 193-197, and A. Kh. Babadzhanian, N. K. Popol', M. a. Shalin, I. M. Kravchenko, Liuki otkryli v berline [They opened the hatchway to Berlin], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), pp. 7-13.
The deployment of the 24th and 66th Armies to the Voronezh region is covered in Ot volzhskikh stepei do avstrilskikh al'p [From the Volga steppes to the Austrian Alps], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 26-27, and I. A. Samchuk, P. G. Skachko, Iu. N. Babikov, I. L. Ghedoi, Ot Volgi do El'by i Pragi [From the Volga to the Elbe and Prague], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), pp. 45-49. The 66th Army received its movement order on 23 March.
32. See "Boevoi prikaz #001 shtaba Kurskogo fronta" [Combat Order #001 of the Kursk Front's headquarters} from "Prikazy NKO i voiskam Voronezhskogo fronta (1943)" [Orders of the NKO and to the Voronezh Front's forces]. F. 417, op. 10564, d. 243, l. 12, which read:
Directive #30077 of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, dated 19. 3. 43, forms the Kursk Front, consisting of the 60th Army, the 38th Army, and the 15th Air Army as of 2300 hours 23 March 1943. Two more armies will be included in the front in the immediate future. I am appointed as the front commander. The boundary lines are: Voronezh, Kastornoe, Kursk, and Novgorod-Severskii on the right; and (excluding) Staryi Oskol, (excluding) Kazatskoe, the Psel River, (excluding) Peschanoe, (excluding) Krasnopol'e, and (excluding) Boromlia on the left.
Commander of the Kursk Front Colonel General Reiter
Member of the front's Military Council Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Susaikov
Front chief of staff Lieutenant General Sandalov
33. See V srazheniiakh za Pobedy: Boevoi put' 38-i armii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 [The battles for the Homeland: the combat path of the 38th Army in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945] (Moscow: "Nauka," 1974), p. 220.
34. For example, planning time for the Stalingrad operation lasted more than one month. Thus, offensive preparations were extensive. Planning time for other operations was as follows: "Little Saturn" -- over three weeks; Ostogozhsk-Rossosh' -- about 20 days; and about one week for the Voronezh-Kastornoe and subsequent operations.
35. For details see, "Perepiski operativnogo otdela shtaba 13A co shtabom 15sd" [Correspondence of the operational department of the 13th Army's headquarters with the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Division], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 183, ll. 193, 204, 206, and 285.
36. "Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 3A, 2. 1-20. 7. 43" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to the forces of the Bryansk Front and the 13th Army, 2 January-20 July 1943], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, ll. 142-144.
37. G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh i voennyk konfliktakh {Secret classification removed: The losses of the USSR's Armed Forces in wars, military operations, and military conflicts], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p. 226.
38. For the full report see "Boevaia kharakteristika 38 gv RD" [The combat characteristics of the 38th Guards Rifle Division]. TsAMO, F. 1131, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 7-8.
39. See "Operativnoe svodki i boevye donesenii 350 sd" [Operational summaries and combat reports of the 350th Rifle Division], TsAMO, f. 1669, op. 1, d. 24, l. 165.
40. See "Otchety shtaba 184 rd o boevykh desistviiakh" [A headquarters 184th Rifle Division account of its combat operations]. TsAMO, f. 1435, op. 1, d. 8, l. 31.
41. These figures are taken from Krivosheev, pp. 186-227.
42. "Boevaia kharakteristika na 121 sd" [Combat Characteristics of the 121st Rifle Division] from "Boevye rasporiazheniia shtaba Voronezhskogo fronta" [Combat orders of the Voronezh Front], TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 252, l. 12.
43. Boevaiai kharakteristika na 248 otdel'nuiu kursantskuiu strelkovuiu brigadu" [Combat characterisitics of the 248th Student Rifle Brigade] from "Boevye rasporiazheniia shtaba Voronezhskogo fronta" [Combat orders of the Voronezh Front], TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 252, l. 13.
44. "Komandiram 1, 2, 3 armeiskikh zagradotriadov. 16. 3. 43g. #0224" [Order #0224, dated 16 March 1943 to the commanders of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Army Blocking Detachments], in "Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A, 2. 1-20. 7. 43" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to the Bryansk Front and 13th Army, 2 January-20 July 1943]. TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l. 105.
45. See "Prikaz chastiam 121sd #0045. 12. 3. 43." [Order #0044 to the 121st Rifle Division's units, dated 12 March 1943] from "Boevye prikazy i pazporiazheniia soedinenii 60A (1942-1943 gg.)" [Combat orders and instructions of the 60th Army's formations (1942-1943)]. TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 215, l. 67.
46. "Prikaz chastiam 121 sd #074. 31. 3. 43g. [Order #074 to the 121st Rifle Division's units, dated 31 March 1943] from "Boevye prikazy soedinenii 60A (1943g.)" [Combat orders to the 60th Army's formations (1943)]. TsAMO, f. 417, op. 10564, d. 251, l. 6.
47. From "Prikaz 65A. 25. 3. 43g." [65th Army Order #4, dated 25 March 1943] in "Dokumenty iz fondov 65A" [Documents from the archives of the 65th Army]. TsAMO, f. 422, op. 10496, d. 81, l. 12.
48. See "Komandirom divizii 13A. #0144. 11. 3. 43g. [Order #0144, dated 11 March 1943, to the commanders of the 13th Army's divisions]. TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l. 80.
49. "Politupravlenie Bryanskogo fronta. 3. 2. 34g. #0523. Komanduiushchim 13 I 48 armii. Sovershenno sekretno"[Order #0523, dated 3 February 1943, of the Bryansk Front's Political Directorate. To the commanders of the 13th and 48th Armies. Top secret from Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A (2. 1-20. 7. 43g.) [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and Red Army General Staff to the forces of the Bryansk Front and 13th Army (2 January-20 July 1943)], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l. 76.
50. "Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta komanduiushchemu 13 armii (kopiia komanduuishchemu 3 armii. 4. 2. 43g." [From a directive of the Bryansk Front's Military Council to the 13th Army commander, dated 4 February 1943, with a copy to the 3d Army commander], from "Direktivy SVGK" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, l 74.
51. "Prikaz voiskam Bryanskogo fronta #31/2. 1. 2. 43g. Sekretno" [Order #31/2 to the Bryansk Front's forces, dated 1 February 1943. Secret] from "Direktivy SVGK" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, l. 70.
52. "Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta ot 6 .2 43g. komanduiushchim, chlennam Voennykh Sovetov, nachal'nikam politotdelov armii [From a 6 February order of the Bryansk Front's Military Council to the commanders, members of the Military Councils, and political workers of the armies] from "Direktivy SVGK" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme high Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, l. 79.
53. "Iz direktivy Voennogo Soveta Bryanskogo fronta ot 17. 2. 43g. [From a 17 February 1943 directive of the Bryansk Front's Military Council] from "Direktivy SVGK" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command], TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174, I. 87.
54. "Direktivy i prikazy SVGK. Genshtaba Kr. Ar. Bryanskogo fronta voiskam" [Directives and orders of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to the Bryansk Front's forces]. TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 174. l. 35.
55. "Direktivy SVGK, GSh, KA voiskam Bryanskogo fronta, 13A, 2. 1-20. 7. 43" [Directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to Bryansk Front and 13th Army forces, 2. 1.-20. 7. 43.] TsAMO, f. 361, op. 6079, d. 173, ll. 138-140.
56. Ibid., l. 164.
57. Direktiva Voennogo Soveta Tsentral'nogo fronta #027 ot 18. 4. 43g. [Directive #027 of the Central Front's Military Council of 18. 4. 43]: [l. 166]
58. General Tarasov was killed in action in Hungary in October 1944 while serving as deputy commander of the 53d Army.