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Несостоявшийся историк
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#810
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 3 мес. назад  
Читал вашу дискуссию с ВП, но не нашел там никаких подкреплений. Зато очень много просто уверений, что вам-то уже доподлинно известно то и сё.

В юриспруденции и теории доказательств есть такое понятие как общеизвестные факты. «Это» известно не только мне, «это» некая совокупность фактов, или факт, настолько очевидный или ранее неоднократно доказанный, что дальнейшие спекуляции по поводу этоко события или факта не имеют значения. Применительно к коммунистическому режиму не требует дальнейших доказательств то, он был самым человеконенавистническим режимом в истории цивилизаций. И не я это придумал

Вы всегда определяете победителя в войне по уровню жизни через десятилетия после ее окончания? И доводы уличных горлопанов тоже всегда используете в дискуссиях? Этому вас учили в юр.академии и это вы сегодня преподаете вашим студентам

Война 1812 года, равно как и война 1941 года указали на органическую неспособность русских полководцев руководить действиями войск, но в той войне хотел воевать народ, а в войне 1941 года он этого не хотел. Да и уроки были извлечены разные из этих войн...
Я определяю победителя по духу солдата, а не по количеству разрушенных городов и занятых населенных пунктов. Тот, кто сумел подняться сильнее того, кто взлетел, но упал навсегда...А потом, зачем же было воевать, если не наслаждаться победой?! Ради идеи союза народов? Так где союз и где народы? Как только появилась свобода, все народы рады были только избавиться от гегемонии России. Ради равенства? Так нет его и не будет, так как бог создал людей разными и генетику еще никто не отменил, слава богу! Ради избавления от захватчика? А не захватчиками ли вели себя большевики в России?
Знаете ли, я когда-то был кадровым офицером и в училище понял некую истину: офицер отстаивает независимость страны, которой присягнул, но не партии или политику, которые этой страной правят. Поэтому и студентов учу объективности, чтобы они до конца верили в невиновность того, кого им придется защищать или судить...
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#811
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 3 мес. назад  
alex2002 пишет:
В юриспруденции и теории доказательств есть такое понятие как общеизвестные факты. «Это» известно не только мне, «это» некая совокупность фактов, или факт, настолько очевидный или ранее неоднократно доказанный, что дальнейшие спекуляции по поводу этоко события или факта не имеют значения. Применительно к коммунистическому режиму не требует дальнейших доказательств то, он был самым человеконенавистническим режимом в истории цивилизаций. И не я это придумал

Понимаете в чем закавыка-то... то, что лично вам кажется «общеизвестным фактом» далеко не всем известно. Кроме эних, значительное число людей, хоть и осведомлены касаемо этого, но не считают его «фактом». Возможно математическую аксиому и не требуется доказывать, но те «факты», которыми вы оперировали, спорны, поскольку не имеют однозначных и непререкаемых аргументов, а кроме того имеют контраргументы. Поэтому в данном случае говорить об «общеизвестных фактах» вообще не приходится. Не надо под это понятие подсовывать всё, что вам хочется.

Война 1812 года, равно как и война 1941 года указали на органическую неспособность русских полководцев руководить действиями войск, но в той войне хотел воевать народ, а в войне 1941 года он этого не хотел. Да и уроки были извлечены разные из этих войн...

Уже надоело слушать ваши голословные утверждения о том, что народ не хотел воевать. Ваши отсылы к числу военнопленных не выдерживают никакой критики.

Я определяю победителя по духу солдата, а не по количеству разрушенных городов и занятых населенных пунктов. Тот, кто сумел подняться сильнее того, кто взлетел, но упал навсегда...А потом, зачем же было воевать, если не наслаждаться победой?! Ради идеи союза народов? Так где союз и где народы?

Ну вот, теперь начинается опять подмена понятий. И союз был и народы.
А воевали против захватчиков, чтобы защитить свою Родину.

Как только появилась свобода, все народы рады были только избавиться от гегемонии России.

Это нормально для любой крупной империи, начиная с Древнего Рима. К победе над фашизмом это не имеет никакого отношения и обусловлено внутренними проблемами государства, а не внешними.

Ради равенства? Так нет его и не будет, так как бог создал людей разными и генетику еще никто не отменил, слава богу! Ради избавления от захватчика? А не захватчиками ли вели себя большевики в России?

Нет. Захватчик — это внешний враг. Большевики были врагами внутренними.

Знаете ли, я когда-то был кадровым офицером и в училище понял некую истину: офицер отстаивает независимость страны, которой присягнул, но не партии или политику, которые этой страной правят. Поэтому и студентов учу объективности, чтобы они до конца верили в невиновность того, кого им придется защищать или судить...

Да как вы можете кого-то учить объективности, коли вы и понятия об этом не имеете? Вам кажется, что вы объективны, если любой довод, вдолблнный вам в бошку идет вразрез с тем, что вам говорят тысячи свидетелей. Мы скорее отмахнетесь от всех них, чем признаетесь. Есть десятки тысяч свидетельств о том, с каким воодушивлением и упорством воевал наш народ против фашистской Германии, но вы от них отмахиваетесь, и единственное, что для вас имеет значение — это явно завышенное число советских военнопленных. Только почему-то к немцам перебежало несколько десятков тысяч человек, еще около миллиона попало в плен из которых опять-таки единицы согласились сотрудничать. А с другой стороны за время войны в рядах РККА всего призывалось, если не путаю, около 27 миллионов человек. Вот когда поделите одно на другое, тогда и появится истинный процент перебежчиков, предателей и мрази, которая променяла свою родину на тридцать сребреников и согласна была стрелять в своих земляков во имя спасения собственной шкуры.
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#814
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 3 мес. назад  
Да как вы можете кого-то учить объективности, коли вы и понятия об этом не имеете? Вам кажется, что вы объективны, если любой довод, вдолблнный вам в бошку идет вразрез с тем, что вам говорят тысячи свидетелей. Мы скорее отмахнетесь от всех них, чем признаетесь. Есть десятки тысяч свидетельств о том, с каким воодушивлением и упорством воевал наш народ против фашистской Германии, но вы от них отмахиваетесь, и единственное, что для вас имеет значение — это явно завышенное число советских военнопленных. Только почему-то к немцам перебежало несколько десятков тысяч человек, еще около миллиона попало в плен из которых опять-таки единицы согласились сотрудничать. А с другой стороны за время войны в рядах РККА всего призывалось, если не путаю, около 27 миллионов человек. Вот когда поделите одно на другое, тогда и появится истинный процент перебежчиков, предателей и мрази, которая променяла свою родину на тридцать сребреников и согласна была стрелять в своих земляков во имя спасения собственной шкуры.

Зря вы о понятии в объективности. Тысячи свидетелей — не аргумент: каждый видит по-своему, это во-первых, во-вторых, практика показывает, что многократно повторенное извне часто становится внутренним убеждением; в-третьих, в воспоминаниях о давно прошедшем всплывает лучшее: чувства, ассоциации, которых на самом деле может и не было, но хотелось бы чтобы были. Так что свидетельские показания спустя 10 или более лет — сомнительный аргумент.
Далее, «призвалось», соглашусь, столько. Но призыв — есть призыв: как тогда, так и сейчас, дело сугубо недобровольное, а в режиме военного времени еще и сверхобязательное, так что, аргумент тоже не ахти...

По поводу стрельюы в своих «земляков» лучше было бы проконсультироваться у модератора сайта, потому как любить родину в Мичигане куда как сподвижней, чем в России. Без обид, прошу Вас.

По сему, господа-товарищи, полагаю, данный спор наскучил нам всем и предлагаю, если позволите, его закончить. Прошу модератора не расстраиваться по поводу некоего офф-топа с моей стороны, и подойти к оценке соответствующих рассуждений без эмоций. Если последний позволит, в скором времени я направлю ему статью о партизанском движении, такую же как и все мои убогие рассуждения, но, думаю, не лишенную новизны и прошу не относиться к ней предвзято. Я получил искреннее удовольствие от дискуссии с грамотными и объективными собеседниками, надеюсь Вы тоже.
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#815
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 3 мес. назад  
I have some observation to make regarding this article. As I don't speak russian, I'll have to use English. If the article was a mere historical disagreement, I would not have written these observations, but as the author stoops to a level which can be described only as personal attacks, some things need to be said.

Just before I start, I have to say that I'm not decided over the issue of a soviet attack against a Germany. While I've read some of the works in question, I think I'm not qualified to make a final judgement. I am a historian myself (just writing my PhD), but on Middle Ages, so WW2 is not my field of expertise.


Technically the Red Army had slightly fewer tanks than the figure mentioned by Rezun – 23,106, to be exact (Military History Journal No.11, 1993, the article can be found here), but let’s not split hairs. The really interesting part of Rezun’s above statement is this: why does Rezun’s analysis compare the number of tanks deployed on the Eastern Front to the Red Army’s entire tank pool? And by ‛entire‛, I mean inclusive of broken-down machines as well as of tanks deployed not on the Western borders but, say, in the Soviet Far East.

[...]

Waving the figure of 24,000 tanks in front of the reader for several chapters as if it were a proven and indisputable fact looks decidedly like a deliberate attempt to mislead.



There is a very simple and logical explanation for this. Suvorov gives the total number of german tanks prepared for the Barbarossa Operation vs the total number of tanks in the soviet inventory and that is how it should be. This difference is caused by the different circumstances in which both armies found themselves on 22 June 1941. An army which is about to attack is massing all its available armor at the borders of the enemy. On the other hand, an army which is not expecting the attack will not have all its armor in the threatened region, but spread across the country. But, when the war starts, the defending side has the possibility to get their remaining tanks ready for battle quickly and send them at the front. The attacking one (in our case, the Wehrmacht) can't do that. Yes, Red Army had only 12,000 tanks in their western regions, but, once the war started, they sent all the others against the germans. The Barbarossa did not end in 1–2 weeks, so the soviets had plenty of time to get the rest of their tanks at the front. The germans, on the other hand, did not have this possibility.

The argument would be valid only if the war was short enough to make the deployment of the other tanks impossible. That was not the case. Operation Barbarossa wasn't the 6 days war.

Regarding the breakdowns: The only moment when an Army can have all its tanks operational is one day before a major offensive. During the war, there was always a high percent of tanks in need of repairs. Take for instance the history of the Panther tank: the highes number of Panthers listed as operational in the Eastern Front was achieved in September 1944 — 522 out of 728. At any point in the war, there was a significant number of tanks in need of repairs.



After reading these criteria, my first thought was that if the T-34 tank were capable of sustained flight, Rezun would have to add a sixth ‛design element‛ to that list. How so? Well, it seems to me that every one of these ‛design elements‛ has been matched specifically to the performance characteristics of the T-34 and KV tanks. But let us assume for a moment that my suspicions in this regard are incorrect, and take Rezun’s criteria at face value. Every one of his ‛design elements‛ prompts, or should prompt, an immediate query as to why that particular design decision is meaningful. Why a 76mm gun? Why must the engine and the tank’s transmission necessarily be ‛housed close together‛? Let’s find out!



I don't understand this argument and the sarcasm seems completely gratuitous. First, there isn't any absolute criterias regarding what made a tank modern in 1941 or not. Every author can make his own decision (on only condition that he should apply those criterias to ALL tanks). As a former tank officer (Suvorov), I don't see why Suvorov should not be entitled to do so.
Second, there is perfectly possible for the T-34 to served as the benchmark and this is nothing to be laughed at.
I'll give an example. Assuming I am asked what makes a fighter «modern» in 2009, I would say:
— supercruise;
— stealth capability;
— thrust vectoring;
— ability to act as a mini-Awacs.
Using the argument from above, someone could accuse me that these characteristics are selected specifically to match the design of the F-22 Raptor. Yes, indeed. It is so, because F-22 is the best fighter in the world by such a margin that it is absolutely normal to use it as the benchmark for the new generation of fighter planes.
The same thing can be said about T-34. In 1941, just like F-22 today, the T-34 tank was in a league of his own. As such, if it was operational — and it was -, it's perfectly normal to use his characteristics as the standard.

And, if I wanted to be sarcastic, I would also add that this seems to be the undeclared position of the official history of WW2. Every history book literally refuses to consider any other tank, bar T-34 and KV, from the soviet inventory in 1941 as «modern», so maybe it should not be so many wonders how can this association described in the quoted paragraph take place.



Rezun makes absolutely no effort to provide any explanation for this, which lends credence to my theory that this particular calibre was chosen simply because that was the calibre of the main gun of the T-34 and KV-1 tanks. [Surely had Rezun had any explanation of his own, he would not have failed to trumpet it at every opportunity, given his tendency to vociferously argue even the most trivial of his hypotheses.] Thus, had the T-34 possessed a 57mm or a 85mm gun, Rezun would have undoubtedly used that figure instead of 76mm. In other words, first we find out the answer to the main problem from the back of the textbook, and then we tailor our written solution to suit the answer. Of course, Rezun wrote ‛at least 76mm‛, but this threshold calibre is selected in a completely arbitrary fashion. Moreover, the criterion itself and Rezun’s sacred ‛76mm‛ has little to do with reality.



Because the 76 mm gun was by far the most powerful gun used on a tank at that time. It was the gun which basically made the transition from the slightly armed tanks of the inter war period to the heavily armed heavy tanks and MBTs from later.



Even in the pre-war years, and certainly by the early period of the war, 76mm calibre guns were considered anything but ‛powerful‛ for a new heavy tank. Quite the contrary, they were thought of as relatively weak, which is why designers focused on developing 85mm and even 107mm tank guns. Even after the war’s start, with all its disruptions for the Soviet armaments industry, work on a new heavy tank with a 107mm main gun continued unabated.



Yes, and the 76 mm gun is certainly underpowered in comparison with the 120 mm guns of the modern MBT. Seriously, man, are you downplaying the 76 mm gun with the argument that designers were developing better guns for the future? Are you for real?
I mean, you claim that the 76 mm was anything but powerful, but at the same time the germans were frantically trying to install a 75 mm gun on their tanks?

Even freaking wikipedia knows better:

«The shock of encountering the Soviet T-34 medium and KV-1 heavy tanks during the first months of Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941 necessitated a new tank gun to meet these threats.[19] In response to the difficulty of penetrating British Matildas during the Battle of France, the Germans had earlier installed a 50-millimetre (1.97 in) L/60 gun—based on the 5 cm PaK 38 anti-tank gun—on a Panzer IV Ausf. D. However, with the rapid German victory in Russia, the original order of 80 tanks was cancelled before they entered production.[20] In November 1941, the decision to up-gun the Panzer IV to the 50-millimetre (1.97 in) L/60 gun was dropped, and instead Krupp was contracted in a joint development to modify Rheinmetall's pending 75-millimetre (2.95 in) anti-tank gun design (later known as 7.5 cm PaK 40 L/46). Because the recoil length of the PaK 40 was too long for the tank's turret, the recoil mechanism and chamber were shortened. This resulted in the 75-millimetre (2.95 in) KwK 40 L/43.»

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_IV#cite_note-20

There were also plans to rearm the T-34 with a more suitable and forward-looking gun system. The best prospect for ‛the main tank of the motorized and mechanized formations of the Red Army‛ was a 57mm calibre gun, not the 76mm weapon. Thus the phrase ‛a powerful long-barrelled 76mm main gun‛ is completely incorrect; the engineers envisioned different gun systems, of both medium and heavy calibre, for different perspective tank designs. The war’s start forced a substantial correction in research and development priorities, and many forward-looking projects were abandoned in favor of inferior designs already in production. This is how the 76mm gun had come to dominate the Red Army tank pool: the gun’s advanced production status and a wide range of available ammunition served as very powerful arguments in the Soviet war economy.

Pretty much irellevant. This 57 mm gun was never installed on any tank. You cannot seriously downplay the 76 mm by comparing it with guns which never got into production.



Tank armor is also a somewhat more complex issue than Rezun makes it out to be. Certainly, the thicker the armor – the better for the tank, at least if one does not mind the associated negative effects, such as a significant increase in weight. The question is really this: did the German tank models circa 1941 have sufficient armor protection? Given the number lost in action from Soviet gunfire – probably yes. There is no need to cite various German commanders arguing the opposite, as generals always pine for a tank with impermeable armor and an unstoppable main gun. In reality, the Red Army’s main anti-tank asset in 1941 was the 45mm Battalion Gun, which could penetrate only 38mm armor from 500 metres and 50mm armor from 100 metres, and oftentimes even less due to the poor quality of its armor-piercing rounds. By contrast, the majority of German Panzer III and IV tank variants as well as the StuG-III assault guns had a frontal armor of 50mm thickness, in other words quite adequate protection from Soviet antitank gunfire.

The task of destroying Soviet infantry divisions was simplified even further as they weren’t issued all the guns listed in their tables of organization and equipment (TO&E). For example, according to a combat readiness report from the 27th Army on the North-western Front dated July 20, 1941, the most well-equipped division was the 5th Rifle Division, which possessed a grand total of 2 45mm guns and 11 76mm guns. That’s 13 guns of any kind for an entire division! Clearly the German tanks were not in dire need of increased armor protection, as the Russians often hadn’t anything to try and penetrate their armor with! Of course, not all Red Army divisions were so badly off, and some of them even managed to have nearly as many guns as they were supposed by TO&E.



You cannot be serious about «not citing german generals». When making such an assessment, I was of the opinion that the field commanders should be taken into consideration.
But no matter, because your whole point is again irellevant. Suvorov does not states whether the german tanks had sufficient armour or not. He states that the T-34 and the KV had much better armor protection.
This whole fuss started from the insistence of the official historiography to consider ONLY the T-34 and the KV as modern. Something which — and I have to agree with Suvorov on this one — is quite unfair. After all, the peak of the german army was the 1940 campaign against France. We know the idea, France crushed in one month, unstoppable blitzkrieg, etc, etc. At that time, the Wehrmacht still had in its inventory the freaking Panzer I and II, which fought in the battle of Hannut, for instance.



Speaking strictly with respect to all-terrain manoeuvrability, the key metric should be not the width of the tank’s tracks, but rather specific ground pressure. The German tanks had ‛narrow‛ tracks, but so what? Even today both Russian and Western armies field some narrow-tracked AFVs. The BMP and BMD series, for instance, or the post-war PT-76 tank. To base one’s view of a tank’s combat mobility purely on the width of its tracks is technical nonsense. Some may point out, of course, that the BMP and BMD AFVs were post-war designs, and aren’t really ‛tanks‛ per se, but that isn’t the point. What I am trying to stress is that instead of ‛wide tracks‛, Rezun should be focused on ‛specific ground pressure‛. Which, in turn, is a metric vital to the performance of any armored fighting vehicle. One can say that this is a trivial detail, that I am splitting hairs, but really, is it possible to believe that this gross technical error is an outlier rather than a symptom?

Of course the low ground pressure of the T-34 and KV tanks was an important asset. But while some German tank models were considerably outmatched in this regard, others were not. In fact, Soviet designers themselves had considered reducing the track width by 100mm to decrease the tanks’ dimensions and thus mass (Soviet of the People’s Commissars of the USSR Declaration No. 1216-502cc, ‛On the production of T-34 tanks during the year of 1941‛). In fact, this document openly suggests that a narrowing of the tracks is an ‛improvement‛ if coupled with adding extra armor (and thus increasing the tank’s overall weight), further exacerbating the issue of increased specific ground pressure. Does this perchance mean that Rezun’s one-sided view of the issue could be wrong? That Soviet designers were not afraid to increase our tanks’ average ground pressure? Not that I am implying that Rezun’s deduction is an outright lie in this case, rather a very narrow and one-sided view of the issue, which he did not bother to verify before using it to draw some very far-reaching conclusions.



The classical image of german tanks bogged down in mud should tell us something, perhaps?
Second, there is something confusing with this argument. First, you state that «Soviet designers themselves had considered reducing the track width by 100mm to decrease the tanks’ dimensions and thus mass» and then you say that «this document openly suggests that a narrowing of the tracks is an ‛improvement‛ if coupled with adding extra armor (and thus increasing the tank’s overall weight)»? The asserted objective of reducing the track width was to decrease mass, but narrowing of the tracks is an improvement only if you add more armor and thus increase the mass?


Regarding the issue about the transmission: as you said, neither transmission mounting provides an absolute advantage over its counterpart. The irony is again gratuitous. Each with his own opinion, right?
Suvorov seems to consider that the ratio weight/armour is the most important thing. I don't see what should be problem.
In regard to your examples, all of them seem to be either light tanks, or AFVs, but no major combat tank. The T-70 was indeed as you say — but I don't recall anyone calling T-70 a «modern» tank.
And, I say again, the fuss started from «which is a modern tank and which is not».


First off, notice how Rezun does not bother to substantiate this claim with one shred of factual evidence. The writing style is effective enough, of course – this has always been Rezun’s strength – but let’s examine the facts for a moment. For one, as of June 22, 1941, most of Soviet tanks had gasoline rather than diesel engines, precisely the type ‛susceptible to brewing up‛ according to Rezun. In fact, all of the following tank models had gasoline engines: T-18, T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, T-40, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7 (except for 700 BT-7M tanks with an early diesel engine V-2), T-28 and T-35. Over 21,000 tanks in all.



Not actually. Since you quoted him, I see that that paragraph says «during World War 2». Not 22 June 1941. The models you mention played a very limited role in the war.

First off, notice how Rezun does not bother to substantiate this claim with one shred of factual evidence. The writing style is effective enough, of course – this has always been Rezun’s strength – but let’s examine the facts for a moment. For one, as of June 22, 1941, most of Soviet tanks had gasoline rather than diesel engines, precisely the type ‛susceptible to brewing up‛ according to Rezun. In fact, all of the following tank models had gasoline engines: T-18, T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, T-40, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7 (except for 700 BT-7M tanks with an early diesel engine V-2), T-28 and T-35. Over 21,000 tanks in all.
Of course, in June of 1941 the Red Army also fielded tanks with diesel engines – the KV-series and the T-34s for a total of just under 2,600 tanks. In other words at the time of the initial German assault – the very time period that all three of Rezun’s books are focused on – roughly 85% of the USSR’s total tank pool was comprised of machines with ‛inflammable‛ gasoline engines. As such, Rezun’s ‛diesel advantage‛ is yet another falsification, utilized as proven and undisputed fact throughout his thesis!





Except that he does not. In the same chapter he specifies which types used diesel engines: T-34, KV, BT-7M and other two (I think T-40 and T-50, but I'm not absolutely sure).



Instead of discussing any of this, Rezun offers us his ‛bucket experiment‛ (a burning torch is extinguished after being dipped in a bucket filled with diesel fuel), as one actually performed at a Soviet tank factory while it was being visited by members of a government task force on tank diesel engine production. Yet even in describing this experiment Rezun neglects crucial details, namely that the task force, upon viewing this experiment, ignored it as irrelevant and ‛amateurish‛.


He does. He specifies that it was Tukhacevsky who rejected it. The reason stated by him is that the Red Army was preparing for «liberation wars» and as such they would face problems with the fuel supplies, as they could not have used captured fuel.
Don't know what could have been the real reason, but it does mention the initial rejection of the experiment.



Reading this, an otherwise uninformed reader cannot help but notice how the clearly near-sighted Germans are outwitted at every turn by the crafty Russians. Not willing to take Rezun at his word, I took the liberty of going straight to the source – in this case, volumes 3 and 4 of the 12-volume Soviet ‛History of the Second World War‛ encyclopaedia, which Rezun actually cites as one of his sources. For added effect, I also threw in the memoirs of Albert Speer, the armament minister of those same ‛near-sighted‛ Germans who could not see the genius of Rudolf Diesel. Turns out the Germans weren’t that near-sighted after all – but that they had, instead, realized that opting for diesel tank engines would be practically suicidal. How so?

Germany’s strategic weakness stemmed from it simply not having enough crude oil. What oil stocks it did have provided just enough diesel fuel to sustain the German Navies and its submarines, while the Luftwaffe consumed all available natural gasoline. The Germans could synthesize gasoline, but not diesel fuel. Thus, installing diesel engines on German tanks would render the Panzer arm useless, as there would not be enough fuel in all of the Third Reich to sustain any large-scale operations. Compounding the problem, according to Speer, was a chronic shortage of aluminium, which is used for making diesel engine housings.



Again, an utterly irellevant counter-argument. Suvorov stated that diesel engines are superior to those based on gasoline. If that is correct or not, the reasons why german tanks used such engines are still irellevant for the issue at hand.
This type of logic would be like that: when someone speaks about the superiority of the US strategic bomber force due to the B-2 Spirit, another should start argue that Russia does not have a similar bomber simply because its economy can't afford such an expensive program. That is correct — but that still does not change the relative quality of the american and russian strategic bomber forces.
The motivations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in using their respectives engines simply has no relevance over the quality of the engines themselves — and over the tanks using them. You went on a tangent of your making, which seems to have nothing to do with the original subject.

The english version of the article stops at the Diesel engine part, so I cannot read further. But I think that's enough. There is still something to be pointed out from the introduction though:



Rezun’s entire argument is based on circumstantial evidence. Take any criminal court of any civilized nation, and you will learn that circumstantial evidence is almost never sufficient to obtain a conviction.


Really?

«Circumstantial evidence is used in criminal courts to establish guilt or innocence through reasoning.

With obvious exceptions (immature, incompetent, or mentally ill individuals), most criminals try to avoid generating direct evidence. Hence the prosecution usually must resort to circumstantial evidence to prove the mens rea levels of „purposely‛ or „knowingly.‛ The same goes for tortfeasors in tort law, if one needs to prove a high level of mens rea to obtain punitive damages.

One example of circumstantial evidence is the behavior of a person around the time of an alleged offense. If someone was charged with theft of money and was then seen in a shopping spree purchasing expensive items, the shopping spree might be circumstantial evidence of the individual's guilt.

Forensic evidence
Other examples of circumstantial evidence are fingerprint, blood analysis or DNA analysis of the evidence found at the scene of a crime. These types of evidence may strongly point to a certain conclusion when taken into consideration with other facts, but if not directly witnessed by someone when the crime was committed, they are still considered to be circumstantial in nature. However, when proved by expert witnesses, they are usually sufficient to decide a case especially in the absence of any direct evidence. Owing to the development in forensic methods, old undecided cases (or cold cases) are frequently resolved.

A popular misconception is that circumstantial evidence is less valid or less important than direct evidence. This is only partly true: direct evidence is popularly, but mistakenly, considered more powerful. In fact many successful criminal prosecutions often rely largely or entirely on circumstantial evidence, and civil charges are frequently based on circumstantial or indirect evidence. Much of the evidence against convicted American bomber Timothy McVeigh was circumstantial, for example. Speaking about McVeigh's trial, University of Michigan law professor Robert Precht said, „Circumstantial evidence can be, and often is much more powerful than direct evidence‛. [1] The 2005 murder trial of Scott Peterson trial was another high-profile conviction based heavily on circumstantial evidence.

Indeed, the common metaphor for the strongest possible evidence in any case—the „smoking gun‛—is in fact an example of proof based on circumstantial evidence. Similarly, fingerprint evidence, videotapes, sound recordings, photographs, and many other examples of physical evidence that support the drawing of an inference, i.e., circumstantial evidence, are considered very strong possible evidence.»


Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circumstantial_evidence#Criminal_Law

I didn't need to be a specialist in law to know this. All I needed to do was to give a search on yahoo. Even freaking wikipedia knows that circumstantial evidence is often accepted.
Besides, a historical debate is not a criminal court. Heck, US even went to war (in Afghanistan) based on circumstantial evidence.
In light of this, I find the statement that «Rezun lies, and very deliberately.» quite ironical.



Supporters of Rezun’s thesis often fall back on more or less the same arguments. Most frequently, they try to find the tiniest imperfection in the opposition’s case. It’s the schoolyard ‛oh yeah?‛ mode of argument. [E.g. two plus two isn’t five — oh yeah, well you’re ugly!] Upon discovering even the most insignificant error, they proceed to make mountains out of molehills and proclaim that this single mistake or omission is of such supreme importance that none of the other ten thousand (correct) arguments made by the same author are worth considering.


I find this paragraph funny. Finding the tiniest imperfection? Lol. To say that I'm an amateur in this field would be a complement. Still, I'm not sure if you can see it, but I have been able to bust every one of your counterarguments by simply using your lack of a basic method and logic when criticizing a historical theory.



As I have been accused on several occasions of falsifying or distorting Rezun’s words to make my arguments, I am going as far as posting images of the actual book covers of my source material. The publisher information for my editions is as follows:



I wonder why am I not surprised...
Besides, you cannot be that naive... can you? Falsifying or distorting someone's statements implies intent and previous knowledge of the distorted assertions. If you seriously claim that the mere posession of a book absolves someone of such suspicions, then you take your readers for a bunch of cretins. Sorry.

The sad part of all these is that you claim this article to be an overview relying on many sources. If these are the best counterarguments the anti-Suvorovs can come up with, it's kinda
pathetic.
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#836
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 3 мес. назад  
Оффтопик потер.
Джентельмены, тема топика — обсуждение конкретной статьи, а не богатого жизненного опыта. Дальнейшее обсуждение личности Резуна перенес в более подходящую тему.
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#950
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Прочитал статью,топик и,ради изучения предмета,скачал «Ледокол».С первых страниц возникло недоумение,Резун пишет что Сталин мечтал завоевать Европу и поэтому вскормил Гитлера,сделал все
чтоб Германия стала сильной в военном плане и завоевала для него другие страны.Возникает простой житейский вопрос-ЗАЧЕМ?? Если,как пишет Резун,военный потенциал Германии после 1-й Мировой был равен нулю,Франция окапывалась,Великобритания не имела сухопутных войск (?),зачем нужен Гитлер, взял бы все (Сталин)сам и всего делов.Дальше первых двух страниц пока не читал и не знаю стоит ли тратить время.Кстати есть очень сильная разница понимания войны у жителей разных районов бывшегоСССР.Я сам живу в Белоруссии и вся моя родня тоже отсюда,для меня война не статьи и миллиметры брони,а объективная реальность.В деревне в заборе вместо столба сошка пушки,у соседа наковальня-замок орудия,мостик через лужу-кусок брони с пробоиной.У одного в огороде вообще часть т-34 закопана,удалось откапать только лобовой лист с пулеметным гнездом и люком механика водителя и часть правого борта,потом прибежал хозяин и прогнал.Общялся с россиянами из Нижнего Тагила так для них война как бы не сильно и страшно.
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#951
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Atomik1977 пишет:
...Возникает простой житейский вопрос-ЗАЧЕМ??...

Элементарно, Ватсон!
Гитлер завоевывают всю Европу. Теряет на этом силы. Он агрессор и осуждаем всем прогрессивным человечеством.
И тут Иосиф Виссарионович — в белом сомбреро! Победив Гитлера, он также все оккупирует, но у него ореол освободителя. Имидж борца с темными силами.
Такова моя версия.
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#952
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Posted by Sentinel:

Because the 76 mm gun was by far the most powerful gun used on a tank at that time.

Not true. French Char-1B had 75mm howitzers, KV-IIs had 152mm howitzer, and Churchill (which just began coming out in June 1941) had a 3-inch howitzer. Now, is a howitzer more powerful then a gun? I will let you decide

Regarding the breakdowns: The only moment when an Army can have all its tanks operational is one day before a major offensive. During the war, there was always a high percent of tanks in need of repairs.

So what was Red Army's expected tank preparation rate supposed to be? By your logic I figure that even at 50% rate they would have been fine..... number wise.

And, if I wanted to be sarcastic, I would also add that this seems to be the undeclared position of the official history of WW2. Every history book literally refuses to consider any other tank, bar T-34 and KV, from the soviet inventory in 1941 as «modern», so maybe it should not be so many wonders how can this association described in the quoted paragraph take place.

Which «every» history book are you referring to? German MarkIVs and IIIs where also modern tanks, as were French Char-1Bs and SAMUAs, and British Cruiser MarkIIIs with Christie Suspension, and even the Czekh T35 was a «modern» tank. What in your definition is a «modern» tank?

You would be surprised but all major belligerents worked and had something similar, if only different in implementation. The real issue here was not the tank per say but how the tank was to be used within the specific armed force — the primary requirement to which all major countries based their tank designs on. Just because German tank guns were not generally as powerful as a 76mm L11 or FG-34 does not mean they needed to be or the Germans thought they should be at the time USSR was attacked. The Russians raised the plank of tank design just a bit — and everyone re-adjusted, including the Germans.

To say that Germans were shocked beyond believe is simply not true. At the time everyone experimented with thicker armor, bigger tanks, larger calibers, more power engines. Actually Germans were quite aware of Soviet tanks at the time USSR was attacked, they saw them back in Finland.

Pretty much irellevant. This 57 mm gun was never installed on any tank. You cannot seriously downplay the 76 mm by comparing it with guns which never got into production.

Not true. Soviet designers experimented installing 57mm on a T-34 platform and these tanks even participated in battle, specifically at Moscow in 1941/42.


After all, the peak of the german army was the 1940 campaign against France.

A what? A peak of the German Army?

We know the idea, France crushed in one month, unstoppable blitzkrieg, etc, etc.

Not just France was crushed. But also the British, Belgians, and Dutch. Basically two powerful countries in Europe — Britain and France — were defeated in a matter of a month. Yeah, the Germans were DAMN GOOD!!!!

At that time, the Wehrmacht still had in its inventory the freaking Panzer I and II, which fought in the battle of Hannut, for instance.

At the time Germans also had MarkIVs, and MarkIIIs, and LT35s. However, I am not sure what relevance this has to anything. What I can tell you is that after Hitler so easily dealt with France and England Stalin shit his pants and quickly began pushing for integration of newer weapons — the primary reason why T-34 and a few other weapon systems in development were so quickly introduced. In fact the rush to get T34 into production so rapidly resulted in many issues.


Again, an utterly irellevant counter-argument. Suvorov stated that diesel engines are superior to those based on gasoline. If that is correct or not, the reasons why german tanks used such engines are still irellevant for the issue at hand.

There is nothing to counter-argument. There were many reasons why Germans, British, Americans, and French chose to use gasoline and Soviets, Japanese chose diesel. In fact even that is not entirely true. All Soviet light tanks, besides BT7 of later models, used gasoline. All your T40s, T50s, T60s, and the rest all used gasoline. Americans, on the other hand, also used diesel engines. All Shermans in the marine corp in the Pacific used diesel, as were the Shermans built for USSR. Choosing between diesel and gasoline has many different considerations chief among them production expertise, technological capabilities, and economic realities.

This type of logic would be like that: when someone speaks about the superiority of the US strategic bomber force due to the B-2 Spirit, another should start argue that Russia does not have a similar bomber simply because its economy can't afford such an expensive program. That is correct — but that still does not change the relative quality of the american and russian strategic bomber forces.

This makes absolutely no sense. We are not talking about B2 bombers but about use of specific engines and fuel types for tanks with plus/minus similar capabilities.

The motivations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in using their respectives engines simply has no relevance over the quality of the engines themselves — and over the tanks using them. You went on a tangent of your making, which seems to have nothing to do with the original subject.

Russian V2 engine was not even Russian in origin. Like everything else concerning «car industries» it was a copied from a French Hispana-Sueza aircraft engine, if memory serves me correctly (Valera should know). Need to dig-up my books for the exact one

If you think that Germans, French, British and especially the Americans, with their enourmous technological and economic capabilities, were stupid for not using diesel or could not make a tank diesel engine? British, for example, equipped their Christie-Suspension Cromwells with V12 gasoline Rolls Royce Meteors. Rolls Royce Meteor was a derated tank version of the most famous aircraft engine of WWII — Royce Rolls Merlin. Do you think that British were stupid?

By the way Russian V-2 engines were pretty crappy, as were all the «car» mechanics in the tank. The Americans were shipped a T-34 and a KV, and they were not in any way impressed either with the engine, transmission, and other essentials.
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#954
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  


Not true. French Char-1B had 75mm howitzers, KV-IIs had 152mm howitzer, and Churchill (which just began coming out in June 1941) had a 3-inch howitzer. Now, is a howitzer more powerful then a gun? I will let you decide


Churchill tanks had a 40 mm gun in 1941. They got a 3 inch howitzer later, from what I know. About the other 2, you are correct. When I made that statement, I was thinking about tanks which played a major role in the war and I forgot about models produced in limited numbers which had an insignificant impact in the war.
But if you imply that a howitzer is more powerful than a gun, that's highly questionable, because howitzers have slower muzzle velocity than guns. This is a very important factor and one of the reason whz IS-2's 122 mm gun is not considered unanimously the best tank gun in WW2, despite the fact that it dwarves all other types in terms of caliber.



So what was Red Army's expected tank preparation rate supposed to be? By your logic I figure that even at 50% rate they would have been fine..... number wise.



Tank preparation is not a value set in stone. It's variable. I remind you the argument I was answering to: that Rezun includes soviet tanks which were «broken down» or in the Far East, implying that those tanks were utterly irellevant. They were not.
Let's say that 4.000 soviet tanks were not operational. Germany attacks on 22 June 1941 with 3.500 shiny tanks. What do you think it would have happened next? The german tanks roll towards Moscow with zero break downs whatsoever and the soviets dump their 4,000 «broken down» tanks into the Volga?
And why the tanks in the Far East should not be counted? Moscow was saved exactly by those Far East units, which played a crucial role during Operation Typhoon, to say the least. The difference is that german tanks in Africa were locked down in combat against the british army in Africa. The soviet tanks in the Far East were not. They constituted a very valuable strategic reserve which turned the tide in 1941 and could have played this role in any other scenario.

As to your question, actually yes. Take Battle for Berlin as a case for study. The total number of tanks possessed by the 3 soviet front was 6,200. The number of operational tanks was only 3,594. I found this information in one of these books: David Glantz «The Titans Clashed» or Tony Le Tissier «Battle for Berlin». That does not mean the soviets were able to use only 3.594 tanks in battle. The other 2,600 were gradually repaired and sent into battle as well.



Which «every» history book are you referring to? German MarkIVs and IIIs where also modern tanks, as were French Char-1Bs and SAMUAs, and British Cruiser MarkIIIs with Christie Suspension, and even the Czekh T35 was a «modern» tank. What in your definition is a «modern» tank?



Well, for instance, Jacques de Launay's «Great Decisions of WW2», which states that the Red Army had 1,800 modern tanks and 14,000 old models. That is just one example. I don't remember ANY book or article on WW2 which would consider any other soviet tank from 1941, besides T-34 and KV, as modern. If you do, point it out.
Regarding my definition of a «modern tank», I'm not actually trying to push one. I'm not playing by my own rules. But I find the double standards disingenous.



To say that Germans were shocked beyond believe is simply not true. At the time everyone experimented with thicker armor, bigger tanks, larger calibers, more power engines. Actually Germans were quite aware of Soviet tanks at the time USSR was attacked, they saw them back in Finland.



I am sorry, I am not going to take your word on this. When I mentioned that, I gave you a source. Those were not my words. Moreso, your claim contradicts everything I read about the Eastern Front. For instance, general Siegfried Westphal calls the T-34 «a very unpleasant surprise, as the german antitank weapons were useless against it».
I would like to see a source for that statement, because, frankly, it looks as if it was pulled out of thin air.
And which «soviet tanks» are you refering to?



Not true. Soviet designers experimented installing 57mm on a T-34 platform and these tanks even participated in battle, specifically at Moscow in 1941/42.



I underline the word «experimented».
If you are splitting hairs, I'll rephrase the original statement: the 57 mm gun was never installed on any mass-produced tank.
Indeed, USSR had about 300 T-34s with 57 mm, but nothing came out of it.



Not just France was crushed. But also the British, Belgians, and Dutch. Basically two powerful countries in Europe — Britain and France — were defeated in a matter of a month. Yeah, the Germans were DAMN GOOD!!!


That is just silly. The British were not crushed at all. A british army was cut off and forced to evacuate. This does not equate with crushing the british.




There is nothing to counter-argument. There were many reasons why Germans, British, Americans, and French chose to use gasoline and Soviets, Japanese chose diesel.


Yeah... that was kinda my point. If someone states that some equipment is better than other, countering this statement with an economic justification as to why was the inferior equipment preferred does not actually defeats the first claim.



In fact even that is not entirely true. All Soviet light tanks, besides BT7 of later models, used gasoline. All your T40s, T50s, T60s, and the rest all used gasoline. Americans, on the other hand, also used diesel engines. All Shermans in the marine corp in the Pacific used diesel, as were the Shermans built for USSR. Choosing between diesel and gasoline has many different considerations chief among them production expertise, technological capabilities, and economic realities.



What exactly is not true? There is nowhere in the statement you quoted that all soviet tanks were on diesel, because they weren't.
Are you trying to put false claims in my mouth, so that you could succesfully counter them?


This makes absolutely no sense. We are not talking about B2 bombers but about use of specific engines and fuel types for tanks with plus/minus similar capabilities.



analogy = a cognitive process of transferring information from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject (the target), and a linguistic expression corresponding to such a process; analogies can be used to strengthen political and philosophical arguments, even when the semantic similarity is weak or non-existent (if crafted carefully for the audience). Analogies are sometimes used to persuade those that cannot detect the flawed or non-existent arguments. (source: wiki)

I used the B-2 analogy to point out a flaw, which I repeat: If someone states that some equipment is better than other, countering this statement with an economic justification as to why was the inferior equipment preferred does not actually defeats the first claim.
Rezun stated the diesel were better, so the counter should have consisted in demonstrating the opposite. Whether the german chose gasoline for economical reasons or because Hitler had a boner for those engines, is quite irrelevant and makes the argument a waste of time.



If you think that Germans, French, British and especially the Americans, with their enourmous technological and economic capabilities, were stupid for not using diesel or could not make a tank diesel engine? British, for example, equipped their Christie-Suspension Cromwells with V12 gasoline Rolls Royce Meteors. Rolls Royce Meteor was a derated tank version of the most famous aircraft engine of WWII — Royce Rolls Merlin. Do you think that British were stupid?



This is again silly. The american and british tank industries had a lot of shortcomings which had never been adressed. For instance, in 1943 and 1944 the allies met Tigers and Panthers which outclassed the allied tanks in armor and firepower. This situation was not fixed until the end of the war. Where were in this case «the enormous technological and economic capabilities» of the americans? The americans have not been able to put on their Sherman a gun comparable with the german 75 and 88 mm tank guns. Were they stupid perhaps?



At the time Germans also had MarkIVs, and MarkIIIs, and LT35s. However, I am not sure what relevance this has to anything. What I can tell you is that after Hitler so easily dealt with France and England Stalin shit his pants and quickly began pushing for integration of newer weapons — the primary reason why T-34 and a few other weapon systems in development were so quickly introduced. In fact the rush to get T34 into production so rapidly resulted in many issues


Oh, it actually does. Quite a lot of relevance in pointing out that the german tank pool were pretty colorful and did not exactly consist only of the last up-to-date models.
Second, I don't understand the reason why, in a reply to a statement about the german tank pool, you shift towards Stalin's psychological state.
But let's have it your way. First, Stalin pushed for integration of newer weapons before the fall of France. The decision to introduce the T-34 and the KV was taken in december 1939. Haven't you implied exactly that in this same post, when you stated that they have seen «russian tanks» in Finland, in reference to T-34?
Second, this idea that «Stalin shit his pants» starts to look more like a historyographical myth to me.
For instance: John Erikson stated in his book Road to Stalingrad that USSR did not make any plans for the evacuation of industries from western Russia. If Stalin shit his pants, meaning that he feared the Red Army could not repel the germans, why did he not take such measures as preparing for evacuations?
Another interesting detail: the first directive of the war ordered the Red Army to encircle and destroy the enemy where it crossed the border. Isn't that a bit too confident for someone who «shit his pants»?
Another: if Stalin shit his pants, what was Molotov doing in Berlin, making demans which were «crawling» into the german sphere of influence? If you are afraid of a lion, you don't throw stones at him. You keep a low profile and try to arm yourself. Yet Molotov is poking Germany.

Something does not fit in this picture. It does not fit at all.

All in all, I have not been impressed by the counter-arguments.
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#956
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Хех, часть его претензий я думаю из-за того, что перевод статьи на английский сделан в где-то 2001–2002 году, а русский вариант серьезно правился после этого пару раз, и в английский перевод эти правки не вошли. В том числе и по дизелям. Попробуйте (если есть желание, конечно) перевести ему нашу оценку двигателя Maybach, которую я привел в русском варианте. думаю, ему будет очень интересно ее почитать.
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#957
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
By Sentinel:

About the other 2, you are correct. When I made that statement, I was thinking about tanks which played a major role in the war and I forgot about models produced in limited numbers which had an insignificant impact in the war.

You said «most powerful» tank guns.

But if you imply that a howitzer is more powerful than a gun, that's highly questionable, because howitzers have slower muzzle velocity than guns. This is a very important factor and one of the reason whz IS-2's 122 mm gun is not considered unanimously the best tank gun in WW2, despite the fact that it dwarves all other types in terms of caliber.

No it does not «dwarf» all other types in terms of caliber. If we are talking about guns then, for example, the Soviet ML-20 152mm gun/howitzer mounted on a fixed platform was bigger in Caliber. Soviets used the SU-152 platform during Kursk, and later mounted this gun on the ISU platform. The Germans mounted 128mm Pak-44 L55 tank gun on the JagerTiger tank destroyer and on the MAUS. They also mounted 155mm weapons on tank destroyers — like the Hummel. They even mounted rocket propelled mortar barrels on fixed tank platforms as was done on Sturmtiger with all its 380mm of power.

As to howitzers — these can be very effective fighting armored, including tanks. A short-barreled low-velocity weapon can be used to fire a shaped projectile, which are very effective. In fact howitzers where used quite often to fight tanks during WWII — especially by Germans and Soviets.


Tank preparation is not a value set in stone. It's variable. I remind you the argument I was answering to: that Rezun includes soviet tanks which were «broken down» or in the Far East, implying that those tanks were utterly irellevant. They were not.
Let's say that 4.000 soviet tanks were not operational. Germany attacks on 22 June 1941 with 3.500 shiny tanks. What do you think it would have happened next? The german tanks roll towards Moscow with zero break downs whatsoever and the soviets dump their 4,000 «broken down» tanks into the Volga?


It's not that easy. You should not be looking at «all tanks» but at separate military structures like specific tank divisions, tank brigades, and other military establishments within the Soviet order of battle which had tanks in their arsenal. And then look at the preparation levels of these particular entities including mobilization potential, logistical capabilities and so on. Glantz, whom you have appeared to have read, has very good description of all that in his «Crumbling Colossus.»

In WWII it was not individual tanks that were fighting the war but tank structures. The German innovation was developing the right organizational tank structures, perfected during the campaigns in Poland and France, which allowed them to crush their enemies even with less number of «inferior» tanks.


As to your question, actually yes. Take Battle for Berlin as a case for study. The total number of tanks possessed by the 3 soviet front was 6,200. The number of operational tanks was only 3,594. I found this information in one of these books: David Glantz «The Titans Clashed» or Tony Le Tissier «Battle for Berlin». That does not mean the soviets were able to use only 3.594 tanks in battle. The other 2,600 were gradually repaired and sent into battle as well.

I hope you are not comparing the Red Army of 1945 with 1941. Two different things.

Well, for instance, Jacques de Launay's «Great Decisions of WW2», which states that the Red Army had 1,800 modern tanks and 14,000 old models. That is just one example. I don't remember ANY book or article on WW2 which would consider any other soviet tank from 1941, besides T-34 and KV, as modern. If you do, point it out.

There are many books on tanks. Look it up.

Regarding my definition of a «modern tank», I'm not actually trying to push one. I'm not playing by my own rules. But I find the double standards disingenous.

I am not disingenuous either but I really want to know what is considered a «modern» tank in 1941. What makes a tank «modern?»


I am sorry, I am not going to take your word on this. When I mentioned that, I gave you a source. Those were not my words. Moreso, your claim contradicts everything I read about the Eastern Front. For instance, general Siegfried Westphal calls the T-34 «a very unpleasant surprise, as the german antitank weapons were useless against it».

What really fascinates me about all those German stories of Soviet «wander» tanks is that they start to complain about these when they began loosing or get stalled. The likes of Guderian and others do not complain about the «indestructible» T-34s until Smolensk or even Moscow, as if German army met no KVs or T34s in the three month earlier. And there were no complains during Soviet disastrous Kharkov and Crimean offensive operations of 1942, only when Staligrad offensive began. In fact I have not read any books where Germans had much trouble dealing with T-34s and KVs in 1941 when encountered on the battlefield.

I would like to see a source for that statement, because, frankly, it looks as if it was pulled out of thin air.

Look it up.

Indeed, USSR had about 300 T-34s with 57 mm, but nothing came out of it.

I am glad you know how to use google. First of all 300 tanks is not a small number, and I don't believe it was 300 but something smaller, and secondly they were used during the battle of Moscow. The experimentation with the 57-mm gun showed the Soviets that the experiment did not work as 57mm, while a descent AT high-caliber weapon, was not good for much else. «Something» did come out of it.


That is just silly. The British were not crushed at all. A british army was cut off and forced to evacuate. This does not equate with crushing the british.

The British were crushed!!!!! Just because they managed to retreat across the channel does not mean they were not crushed. Militarily it was disastrous for the British.


What exactly is not true? There is nowhere in the statement you quoted that all soviet tanks were on diesel, because they weren't.
Are you trying to put false claims in my mouth, so that you could succesfully counter them?


I am not trying to attribute anything to you. All I am trying to say that diesel was not «God Sent» decision.

Analogies are sometimes used to persuade those that cannot detect the flawed or non-existent arguments. (source: wiki)

I am not a big fan of wiki info, besides the most general, but when you use analogies lets try using apples/apples without any other fruits.

Rezun stated the diesel were better, so the counter should have consisted in demonstrating the opposite. Whether the german chose gasoline for economical reasons or because Hitler had a boner for those engines, is quite irrelevant and makes the argument a waste of time.

Rezun throws out his own opinion supported by very weak arguments without putting anything into the right context and using popular history to make conclusions. In fact he has two arguments for a diesel in the «Icebreaker» — it does not «burn» and it has some mechanical advantages over gasoline in specific type of engines. Unfortunately none of it gives the exact reasons why Soviets selected the diesel and why diesel was not very popular, or rather used, in tanks of other countries. Everyone knew about diesel including the French, where diesel was invented by Rudolf Diesel. The French, Germans, Americans, Japanese, and the British were building diesel engines for their automobiles, tractors and even planes since 1920s and certainly knew all the advantages... in fact they were a lot more versed in all that then the Soviets who had a very weak engine industry.

The problem with your B2 bomber analogy is that B2 has absolutely nothing in the world you can compare it to. If you are comparing things why not compare specific engines and their qualities.


This is again silly. The american and british tank industries had a lot of shortcomings which had never been adressed. For instance, in 1943 and 1944 the allies met Tigers and Panthers which outclassed the allied tanks in armor and firepower. This situation was not fixed until the end of the war. Where were in this case «the enormous technological and economic capabilities» of the americans? The americans have not been able to put on their Sherman a gun comparable with the german 75 and 88 mm tank guns. Were they stupid perhaps?

A what????????? Americans and the British mounted guns quite comparable to German 75mm and 88mm guns. Famous British 76mm 17pounder mounted on a Sherman firing APDS rounds was quite a butte-kicker, American M1-76mm gun equipped Sherman and Hellcats had a very good punch similar to Soviet 85mm on T-34s, and finally the 90mm AT/AA gun on the M-26 Pershing and M38 tank destroyers was very similar to the German 88mm. The British also mounted the 17-pounder on the Comet and was the main weapon of the post war Centurions.

Americans and the British had plenty of ways to fight German tanks, principle of these was aviation and artillery. Allies had plenty of both.


Oh, it actually does. Quite a lot of relevance in pointing out that the german tank pool were pretty colorful and did not exactly consist only of the last up-to-date models.

See above.

But let's have it your way. First, Stalin pushed for integration of newer weapons before the fall of France. The decision to introduce the T-34 and the KV was taken in december 1939.

I think you are talking about the KV, when first were tested. The T34 itself was still in experimental state in May 1940 and it was after France that decision was made to put the tank in production.

Haven't you implied exactly that in this same post, when you stated that they have seen «russian tanks» in Finland, in reference to T-34?

KVs and SMK.

Second, this idea that «Stalin shit his pants» starts to look more like a historyographical myth to me.

Well, after the fall of France Stalin was trying to appease Hitler in every way possible — avoiding war at all costs. But this is a different story.

For instance: John Erikson stated in his book Road to Stalingrad that USSR did not make any plans for the evacuation of industries from western Russia. If Stalin shit his pants, meaning that he feared the Red Army could not repel the germans, why did he not take such measures as preparing for evacuations?

I can think of many reasons. The primary reason was that it made NO SENSE. Evacuation of industry is not something that you do as a «precaution» in a country as large as USSR.

Another interesting detail: the first directive of the war ordered the Red Army to encircle and destroy the enemy where it crossed the border. Isn't that a bit too confident for someone who «shit his pants»?

I am not sure about you but if I were the commander of a Soviet Army in 1941 the first order I would give is to «encircle and destroy the enemy.» I am not sure how familiar with Soviets military history but in 1941 Soviets actually had contingency plans for exactly these types of eventualities. You would be surprised but in 1939 even such «aggressive» countries as Poland had plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy — which was the exact order given. All countries had such plans and USSR, which was not a small country, definitely had one.

How this was executed and how prepared USSR was for war, especially for war against Germany, is a different story.

Another: if Stalin shit his pants, what was Molotov doing in Berlin, making demans which were «crawling» into the german sphere of influence? If you are afraid of a lion, you don't throw stones at him. You keep a low profile and try to arm yourself. Yet Molotov is poking Germany.

Molotov was in Berlin on June 22, 1941? That's something new. In fact from 1938 forward, especially following debacle with Czechoslovakia, Soviets, were trying to appease the Furher in every way possible. Interestingly enough the Soviets were afraid of very many things:
1. A joint German/Polish attack.
2. A joint German/Polish/British/French/Japanese attack
3. After the fall of Poland a joint German/British/French attack.
4. After the fall of France a joint German/British attack

I am also not inserting Finland, Romania, Hungary and Turkey — all of which USSR was afraid of.

Something does not fit in this picture. It does not fit at all.

Yeah, the history of the time is not very simple.

All in all, I have not been impressed by the counter-arguments.

If you are interested in political history of the time I believe the best book on the matter is Gabriel Gorodetsky's «Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia.» In fact there are tons of books on all these events from all the Munich conferences, to all Soviet policies.... quite a few people made their Ph.D. just on that. I recommend you change your thesis to WWII as more research is always needed.
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#959
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  


You said «most powerful» tank guns.



Yes, I forgot about the 152 mm howitzer on KV-2 and I explained why. The others are questionable. So?



No it does not «dwarf» all other types in terms of caliber. If we are talking about guns then, for example, the Soviet ML-20 152mm gun/howitzer mounted on a fixed platform was bigger in Caliber. Soviets used the SU-152 platform during Kursk, and later mounted this gun on the ISU platform. The Germans mounted 128mm Pak-44 L55 tank gun on the JagerTiger tank destroyer and on the MAUS. They also mounted 155mm weapons on tank destroyers — like the Hummel. They even mounted rocket propelled mortar barrels on fixed tank platforms as was done on Sturmtiger with all its 380mm of power.


I said tank gun. The ones you mention were either self-propelled howitzers or tank destroyers. And the Maus never got into production.



It's not that easy. You should not be looking at «all tanks» but at separate military structures like specific tank divisions, tank brigades, and other military establishments within the Soviet order of battle which had tanks in their arsenal. And then look at the preparation levels of these particular entities including mobilization potential, logistical capabilities and so on. Glantz, whom you have appeared to have read, has very good description of all that in his «Crumbling Colossus.»

In WWII it was not individual tanks that were fighting the war but tank structures. The German innovation was developing the right organizational tank structures, perfected during the campaigns in Poland and France, which allowed them to crush their enemies even with less number of «inferior» tanks.



Maybe, but I was under the impression that we were discussing «all tanks», not «separate military structuress». That looks like moving the goalposts to me.



I hope you are not comparing the Red Army of 1945 with 1941. Two different things.


Actually I am. At the end of the war, when they unleashed the assault on Berlin, Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky had only 60% of their tanks operational.
Maybe are you implying that the Red Army in 1945 was in a worse shape than in 1941?



There are many books on tanks. Look it up.


I am sorry, but that is not an acceptable answer. When your statement is questioned, the onus is upon you to provide a source. To reply telling your interlocutor to search for himself is just pathetic. It amounts to nothing less than admitting that you just made it up.



I am not disingenuous either but I really want to know what is considered a «modern» tank in 1941. What makes a tank «modern?»


The question of what is a «modern tank» is highly subjective and it depends on the terms of comparison. A Panzer IV is a very modern tank in comparison to Panzer II. Not so much in comparison to T-34. In our case, the controversy started based on Suvorov's definition of a modern tank, which used T-34 as the benchmark. While the review criticized the choice, I pointed out that the choices were not unreasonable.
Quite the opposite, if someone decides to use T-34 characteristics in order to define a modern tank, I would sat it's a good choice. You might disagree, but in that case the new standards should apply to other soviet tanks as well, like BT-7, T-26, T-28, etc.



What really fascinates me about all those German stories of Soviet «wander» tanks is that they start to complain about these when they began loosing or get stalled. The likes of Guderian and others do not complain about the «indestructible» T-34s until Smolensk or even Moscow, as if German army met no KVs or T34s in the three month earlier. And there were no complains during Soviet disastrous Kharkov and Crimean offensive operations of 1942, only when Staligrad offensive began. In fact I have not read any books where Germans had much trouble dealing with T-34s and KVs in 1941 when encountered on the battlefield.



You seriously start to get on my nerves now. Let's take David Glantz's «When Titans Clashed». I will adress both your previous denial that the germans were surprised by the T-34 and your claim that you have not read any books where germans had much trouble dealing with T-34s and KVs in 1941.
I searched for every mention of the T-34 in combat in Glantz's book for 1941 and this is what I found out:

page 54, describing the attack of the 15 mechanized corp on 23 June: «The handful of T-34 tanks in this attack gave the germans a momentary fright».

page 67: «the massed appearance of these mechanized units in the field against the 1 Panzer Group at the end of June was almost as great a surprise as the first encounters with KV-1 and T-34 tanks».

page 81: «Colonel Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade, equipped with newly produced T-34s. diplayed a tactical ability that the invaders had not encountered before. Katukov concealed his armor in the woods while the german advance guard rolled by. Leliushenko's patchwork collection of infantry and airborne troops blocked 4th Panzer from the front, after which Katukov ambushed the germans from the flank. The undergunned, underarmored german Mark IV attempted to break out of the ambush by maneuvering around Katukov, but were quickly halted by short counterattacks. By the end of the day, most most of the 4th Panzer Division's armor had been reduced to smoking hulks. This shock to Second Panzer Group, which had been redesignated Second Panzer Army, was so great that a special investigation was conducted».

The reason why I used this book is because I have it nearby right now, but like that are many. You seem to put much stock in Glantz's opinion. Do you notice how he calls the Mark IVs, which were the best tanks the Wehrmacht had? Undergunned and underarmored.
I could find other such examples, but, since every time I asked you for sources, you showed me the finger, I don't think I should bother.



Look it up.



Oh, really? I looked up and I failed to find it. PLease specify it.



First of all 300 tanks is not a small number, and I don't believe it was 300 but something smaller, and secondly they were used during the battle of Moscow. The experimentation with the 57-mm gun showed the Soviets that the experiment did not work as 57mm, while a descent AT high-caliber weapon, was not good for much else. «Something» did come out of it.



Actually, there were 324 from my knowledge, but that's not the issue here. And, yes, when I said «nothing came out of it», I was refering to the fact that the 57 mm gun was abandoned as a tank weapon.



I am not a big fan of wiki info, besides the most general, but when you use analogies lets try using apples/apples without any other fruits.


Beg your pardon, I've read some studies which proved that wiki is just as accurate as Encyclopedia Britannica. Certainly, wiki is not a good source for an academic research, but for a discussion on a message board is more than adequate.
As to your request, you missed the point. The analogy refered to the rationale used, not the characteristics of the equipment.



The problem with your B2 bomber analogy is that B2 has absolutely nothing in the world you can compare it to. If you are comparing things why not compare specific engines and their qualities.



Reading comprehension not your strength? Maybe because I was not comparing specific engines and their qualities, but the usage of a specific logical process in 2 situations given. More exactly, that choosing a specific equipment for economical reasons is not an argument which can be used in a qualitative comparison.



A what????????? Americans and the British mounted guns quite comparable to German 75mm and 88mm guns. Famous British 76mm 17pounder mounted on a Sherman firing APDS rounds was quite a butte-kicker, American M1-76mm gun equipped Sherman and Hellcats had a very good punch similar to Soviet 85mm on T-34s, and finally the 90mm AT/AA gun on the M-26 Pershing and M38 tank destroyers was very similar to the German 88mm. The British also mounted the 17-pounder on the Comet and was the main weapon of the post war Centurions.

Americans and the British had plenty of ways to fight German tanks, principle of these was aviation and artillery. Allies had plenty of both.



Lol. This statement is self-contradictory. First you state that the US and british tanks had powerful enough guns to fight the german tanks, then you claim that the main allied weapons against the german tanks were aviation and artillery.
Obviously. That is actually what ensured the allied success, else the Tigers and the Panthers would have turned the allied tanks into coffins. But I was talking ONLY about the allied tank industry. Next time, maybe you will actually read the statements you are answering to.




I can think of many reasons. The primary reason was that it made NO SENSE. Evacuation of industry is not something that you do as a «precaution» in a country as large as USSR.



Maybe. The problem with your answer is that statement was not mine. John Erikson said it. This is what he says in «Road to Stalingrad», page 237:
«For all the superhuman effort of the evacuation (which even a minimum of forward planning would have made less critical) much remained and was overrun.»

Obviously, John Erikson does not see things your way.
Besides, your attitude starts to look now plainly dumb. Let's see:

You claim Stalin shit his pants seeing the defeat of France and its allies.
The first thing the soviets did after the invasion was to start evacuation of the industry from the western areas.

Yet you claim that planning forward for the evacuation made no sense.

Next time you want to make a counter, don't pick an argument straight from the notebook of Wily E. Coyote.



I am not sure about you but if I were the commander of a Soviet Army in 1941 the first order I would give is to «encircle and destroy the enemy.» I am not sure how familiar with Soviets military history but in 1941 Soviets actually had contingency plans for exactly these types of eventualities. You would be surprised but in 1939 even such «aggressive» countries as Poland had plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy — which was the exact order given. All countries had such plans and USSR, which was not a small country, definitely had one.




Who said anything about orders of «encircling and destroying» the enemy being evidence of aggressive intentions?
First, the order did not come from some «commander of a soviet army», but from Moscow HQ — which is Stalin.
Of course that other countries had plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy. Polish generals even spoke about cavalry raids towards Berlin. Also, having plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy has nothing to do with being agressive or not. But it has a lot to do with the confidence you have in your capabilities. The Poles were a bit too full of themselves in 1939 — hence the plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy.
Since you don't seem to understand the main idea, I'll draw it in crayon for you:

Stalin shit his pants = low confidence in Red Army.
Stalin giving orders to «encircle and destroy» the enemy = high confidence in Red Army.

The first is your interpretation. The second is a fact. You just keep digging a deeper and deeper hole for yourself.



Molotov was in Berlin on June 22, 1941? That's something new. In fact from 1938 forward, especially following debacle with Czechoslovakia, Soviets, were trying to appease the Furher in every way possible. Interestingly enough the Soviets were afraid of very many things:
1. A joint German/Polish attack.
2. A joint German/Polish/British/French/Japanese attack
3. After the fall of Poland a joint German/British/French attack.
4. After the fall of France a joint German/British attack

I am also not inserting Finland, Romania, Hungary and Turkey — all of which USSR was afraid of.




Who said anything about Molotov being in Berlin on 22 June 1941 ? Let's take another look at my statement:

«Another: if Stalin shit his pants, what was Molotov doing in Berlin, making demands which were «crawling» into the german sphere of influence? If you are afraid of a lion, you don't throw stones at him. You keep a low profile and try to arm yourself. Yet Molotov is poking Germany.»

I don't see «22 June 1941» anywhere. You know when was Molotov in Berlin, right? (Hint: November 1940, when Stalin was apparently shitting his pants and he was displaying his fear by asking Hitler — through Molotov — to abandon Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland into the soviet sphere of influence).




If you are interested in political history of the time I believe the best book on the matter is Gabriel Gorodetsky's «Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia.» In fact there are tons of books on all these events from all the Munich conferences, to all Soviet policies.... quite a few people made their Ph.D. just on that. I recommend you change your thesis to WWII as more research is always needed.



Thanks for the advice. I'll also give you one: better to shut your mouth and be thought a fool than open it and remove all doubt. If that's the best you can do, Rezun does not even need to try to defend his thesis — it is sufficient to let you guys speak, because you are doing a miserable job of it. I don't know if you have noticed, but I managed to prove you are spouting rubbish using scholars like David Glantz and John Erickson, which are among the chief opponents of Rezun's thesis and that says a lot. As far as I'm concerned, I don't take cheek or advice from people who refuse to name their sources when their nonsense is questioned.
You should seriously consider some research yourself, though. Maybe this way you will finally find books describing the troubles the germans had with T-34 and KV, because until now you have obviously not exhausted yourself searching.
I entered this discussion hoping for an intelligent debate, but it seems I was wrong, so I'm not going to cheapen my existence by indulging this sillyness any further.
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#960
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
By Sentinel:


Maybe, but I was under the impression that we were discussing «all tanks», not «separate military structuress». That looks like moving the goalposts to me.

Tanks don't just drive around the country-side shooting up things. Tanks belong to military structures and it's these structures that are fighting wars — not individual tanks. If these structures are not adequately staffed, or they are not working as designed then it doesn't matter how good specific tanks are. You can have divisions staffed with «non-modern» tanks which can do wanders and divisions which are armed with the latest and are crap. Israelis, for example, gave Syrians run for the money in their «antiquated» Shermans on the Golan in 1973.


Actually I am. At the end of the war, when they unleashed the assault on Berlin, Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky had only 60% of their tanks operational.
Maybe are you implying that the Red Army in 1945 was in a worse shape than in 1941?


The Red Army of 1945 was a different Army then the one in 1941. There is simply nothing to compare with.

The question of what is a «modern tank» is highly subjective and it depends on the terms of comparison.

To me a modern tank means a tank with MODERN features.

A Panzer IV is a very modern tank in comparison to Panzer II. Not so much in comparison to T-34.

Interesting. What makes Panzer IV «less modern» then T-34? Or a Matilda.


You seriously start to get on my nerves now. Let's take David Glantz's «When Titans Clashed». I will adress both your previous denial that the germans were surprised by the T-34 and your claim that you have not read any books where germans had much trouble dealing with T-34s and KVs in 1941.
I searched for every mention of the T-34 in combat in Glantz's book for 1941 and this is what I found out:

page 54, describing the attack of the 15 mechanized corp on 23 June: «The handful of T-34 tanks in this attack gave the germans a momentary fright».




page 67: «the massed appearance of these mechanized units in the field against the 1 Panzer Group at the end of June was almost as great a surprise as the first encounters with KV-1 and T-34 tanks».

page 81: «Colonel Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade, equipped with newly produced T-34s. diplayed a tactical ability that the invaders had not encountered before. Katukov concealed his armor in the woods while the german advance guard rolled by. Leliushenko's patchwork collection of infantry and airborne troops blocked 4th Panzer from the front, after which Katukov ambushed the germans from the flank. The undergunned, underarmored german Mark IV attempted to break out of the ambush by maneuvering around Katukov, but were quickly halted by short counterattacks. By the end of the day, most most of the 4th Panzer Division's armor had been reduced to smoking hulks. This shock to Second Panzer Group, which had been redesignated Second Panzer Army, was so great that a special investigation was conducted».

The reason why I used this book is because I have it nearby right now, but like that are many. You seem to put much stock in Glantz's opinion. Do you notice how he calls the Mark IVs, which were the best tanks the Wehrmacht had? Undergunned and underarmored.
I could find other such examples, but, since every time I asked you for sources, you showed me the finger, I don't think I should bother.


I think it's the only book you've read. Anyways, Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade which fought and stalled Guderian at Mtsensk, for a few days, was a collection of quite a few different tanks including T-34s, a few KVs, and mostly BTs. And it wasn't just Katukov 4th Brigade which was fighting that battle but quite a few divisions commanded by Lelushenko.

Glatnz's «Titans Clashed» is just a quick overview of things not the bible of WWII.

Look it up.

Beg your pardon, I've read some studies which proved that wiki is just as accurate as Encyclopedia Britannica. Certainly, wiki is not a good source for an academic research, but for a discussion on a message board is more than adequate.
As to your request, you missed the point. The analogy refered to the rationale used, not the characteristics of the equipment.




Reading comprehension not your strength?

Mi ablo Espanol tambien...

Maybe because I was not comparing specific engines and their qualities, but the usage of a specific logical process in 2 situations given. More exactly, that choosing a specific equipment for economical reasons is not an argument which can be used in a qualitative comparison.

I thought we are comparing different engines.

Lol. This statement is self-contradictory. First you state that the US and british tanks had powerful enough guns to fight the german tanks, then you claim that the main allied weapons against the german tanks were aviation and artillery.

? Fine. Allies had tank guns, artillery, air-power, and infantry weapons to fight enemy tanks. Principle among these tank killers were artillery and air-power.

Obviously. That is actually what ensured the allied success, else the Tigers and the Panthers would have turned the allied tanks into coffins. But I was talking ONLY about the allied tank industry. Next time, maybe you will actually read the statements you are answering to.

I don't get your logic about the coffins. Please elaborate.
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#961
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  


Fine. Allies had tank guns, artillery, air-power, and infantry weapons to fight enemy tanks. Principle among these tank killers were artillery and air-power.




This is funny stuff. Let's see how this argument ran:

You: The V2 was not that good. The allies were perfectly capable of installing a diesel on tanks if those engines were much better, due to their technological and economical capabilities.
Me: The technological and economical capabilities of the allies are no guarantee. Despite them, the allies had not been able to fix many shortcomings of their tanks, particularly in firepower and armor.
You: Several types of tanks and tank destroyers had comparable firepower, but the main weapons used by the allies against the german tanks were artillery and aviation.

Well, ok.

If that is not moving the goalposts, then I don't know what is.

Let me recapitulate for you again: my original point was that the article's statement on the engines moved the goalposts from «are diesel engines better than gasoline engines» to «why did the germans used diesel». We have two types of arguments here:

Argument A: «Is weapon X better than weapon Y?»
Argument B: «Why did country Z chose weapoon Y?»

My point is that Argument B does not necessarly answer the Argument A, because Country Z can pick weapon Y even if weapon Y is inferior to Weapon X. The rationale can be applied to any kind of weapon and your claim that we should compare apples with apples is moot.
Examples:

Argument A: «Is B-2 better than Tu-160?»
Argument B: «Why did Russia chose Tu-160?»

From Argument B, it does not result that, if Russia chose a more classic type of strategic bomber, like Tu-160, then Tu-160 is better than B-2, nor does Argument B have any relevance for the issue raised by Argument A.

Let's apply this to our engines:

Argument A: «Is diesel engine better than gasoline engine?»
Argument B: «Why did Germany chose gasoline engine?»

From Argument B it does not result that, if Germany chose gasoline engines due to lack of diesel fuel, then gasoline engines are better than diesel engines, nor does Argument B have any relevance for the issue raised by Argument A.

In our case, Suvorov brought forward argument A and his answer was yes. The article brought forward Argument B in order to counter argument A. Unfortunately, Argument B and Argument A are not connected. The answer to argument B does not provide an answer to argument A, neither in favor of Suvorov's opinion, nor against.
It was a great methodological mistake and that was my point. Not whether diesel was better or not.

In answer to my observation, you went on a tangent of your own making, claiming that the V2 was poor, that other industries would surely had been abled to produce diesel engines if they wanted to, etc.

I'm not holding my hopes high that you will understand, though, because apparently it seems that you don't want to and there is nothing I can do about it.





I think it's the only book you've read. Anyways, Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade which fought and stalled Guderian at Mtsensk, for a few days, was a collection of quite a few different tanks including T-34s, a few KVs, and mostly BTs. And it wasn't just Katukov 4th Brigade which was fighting that battle but quite a few divisions commanded by Lelushenko.



Albert Seaton, «Battle for Moscow»:

page 93: "As the german troups poured through the gaps there were frequent counterattacks by T-34 and KV tanks which were particularly nerve-racking to the german infantry since the 37 mm antitank gun had become, in their own words, little better than a museum piece.

page 96: "Katukov's 1 Tank Brigade, recently from the Leningrad area, which happened to be on rail flats between Kalinin and Moscow, was ordered on to Msensk railway station by Fedorenko of the Main Tank Directorate of the Soviet High Command. Katukov, who 4 years later was to fight his way into Berlin in command of the 1 Guards Tank Army, unloaded his tanks, mostly T-34 and KV.

page 113: «Kuntzen's 57 Panzer Corps was hurrying its preparations to breach the line while the cold weather lasted, when suddenly, on 13 October, it was violently counter-attacked by soviet 43 army from the area of Borovsk, tanks and artillery being used in strength. The infantry 37 mm antitank guns were rolled flat by the incoming KV and T-34 tanks»

page 125, refering to the 98 german infantry division's defense of Nara: «At 8 o'clock in the morning a line of T-34 tanks, a type never met before by the 98 infantry division, came rumbling into the tack, closely followed by infantry. The Soviet artillery continued to pound german positions, making it difficult to hear or see what was going on. Finally, as the tanks closed in on the village called Gorki, the defending infantry of a batallion of 282 regiment leaped out of their weapon pits in panic and ran, leaving their wounded behind. This no unit would do unless in extremis since german troops falling into Red Army hands were often brutally murdered. A second german batalion was overrun by the incoming T-34 tanks, the 37 mm antitank guns being flattened under the broad tank tracks, to the terror of the gun crews who kept them firing until the last moment.»
Conclusion (several paragraphs lower): The german failure lay in the lack of good anti-tank guns and they had to bring 88 mm flak guns in order to save themselves.

David Glantz's Battle for Leningrad, page 32: «Soliankin's tank division, which was equipped with approximately 300 tanks, including several battalions with about 50 of the new KV-1 models, reached the german bridgehead late in the afternoon of 24 June and immediatelly attacked. In 20 minutes of fierce fighting, more than 100 soviet tanks overwhelmed the defenders and rolled across the river literally crushing the defenders. The batalion might have held out longer, had it not been for the KVs. There was not a weapon in the bridgehead that could have stopped them. After the massacre, the tanks waded through the Dubysa, crawling up the 45 degree banks with ease. When the soviet tanks lurched over the lip of the west bank they were met by fires from the entire 6th Panzer Division artillery and enfilade fire from every antitank gun the division could bring to bear. Enveloped by a tornado of fire and smoke, the mass tank attack rolled on. With growing apprehension, then in instances of near panic, the grenadiers began to realize that their weapons were useless against the big tanks. Soon some soviet tanks split off from the main attack force and took on the antitank guns on the flanks of the armoured column, rolling over the dug-in guns. The 6th Panzer Division's harrowing experience continued for 3 more days. On 25 June, the division engaged the russian force with more than 100 tanks, one third of them Mark IV from the 11 Panzer Regiment, in an attempt to halt the russians iron monsters, but their shells bounced harmlessly of the russian tanks».

Now let's look again at your statement: «In fact I have not read any books where Germans had much trouble dealing with T-34s and KVs in 1941 when encountered on the battlefield.»

And, btw, both Glantz and Seaton point out that Katukov had mostly T-34 and KV, not «mostly BT», as you say. Another fabrication from your part.

Let's also take a look at how David Glantz describes the soviet tanks, since we are at it. Glantz blames the soviet failures on organisational and logistical problems, but let's see what he has to say on the tank models, as this was the subject originlly adressed in the article:

Stumbling Colossus, page 119: «In general terms, despite these organizational, structural and equipment problems, in addition to being more numerous, both the old and the new model soviet tanks were clearly superior to their german counterparts. German light tanks (Mark I and II) were inferior to the soviet BT series and the T-26 and medium tanks like Mark III and IV were outstripped by the medium T-34 and the heavy KV. The new soviet T-34 and KV tanks were superior to any models the germans fielded in terms of firepower, armor and mobility. Their diesel engines were less prone to fire than the german tanks' gasoline engines, the frontal armor of the T-34 could be penetrated only by 50 mm antitank shells (within a range of 500 meters) and the KV was invulnerable to all existing enemy antitank weaponry. In addition, the older model soviet tanks could defeat any existing german tank. The soviet diesel-driven T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 could destroy all german tanks and even the 45 mmm guns on soviet light tanks could defeat all german armor except the Mark IV.»

When I used «When Titans Clashed» you started whining that that book is just a quick overview. This time I used a book YOU recommended.
The passage quoted above describes the soviet tanks, in a nutshell, in an a manner basically identical to that used by Suvorov and, moreso, in a book intended to counter Suvorov's claim no less.

If David Glantz (of all people!) is a Rezunist, I'll eat my hat.


Bluntly speaking, I think you have not read anything. And I also happen to think you are just blowing a load of hot air.
I'm not going to bother with someone who says «look it up» when asked for a source, because such a person can basically make up any garbage and push it forward as a fact. A tactic you have already tried to use
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#963
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
By Sentinel:

Maybe. The problem with your answer is that statement was not mine. John Erikson said it. This is what he says in «Road to Stalingrad», page 237:
«For all the superhuman effort of the evacuation (which even a minimum of forward planning would have made less critical) much remained and was overrun.»

Obviously, John Erikson does not see things your way.


I just re-read the few pages of passages in the «Road To Stalingrad» pages 232 to 237 and saw no such thing in Erickson's conclusions. In fact there are no conclusions as such. On the contrary he talks about various evacuation decisions and their implementation.

I am not sure of how from one statement from Erickson you have concluded that Stalin should have evacuated all of his industry at their first sign of danger from Hitler. May be you can elaborate on that.


You claim Stalin shit his pants seeing the defeat of France and its allies.
The first thing the soviets did after the invasion was to start evacuation of the industry from the western areas. Yet you claim that planning forward for the evacuation made no sense.
Next time you want to make a counter, don't pick an argument straight from the notebook of Wily E. Coyote.


A what? Wily E. Coyote? If you cannot express your thoughts in English — can you please do it in Russian. I am seriously lost with all your Bug Bunny logic. We are talking about WWII — remember?


Who said anything about orders of «encircling and destroying» the enemy being evidence of aggressive intentions?
First, the order did not come from some «commander of a soviet army», but from Moscow HQ — which is Stalin.


Yeah — from the General staff. In most countries in the world such orders do happen to come from such levels of authority. For example here, in the United States, president has such an authority. Our current leadership is questionable in that particular capability but that's a different story

Of course that other countries had plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy. Polish generals even spoke about cavalry raids towards Berlin. Also, having plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy has nothing to do with being agressive or not. But it has a lot to do with the confidence you have in your capabilities. The Poles were a bit too full of themselves in 1939 — hence the plans to «encircle and destroy» the enemy.

Confidence in your capabilities? What is that supposed to mean? What the hell was Polish army supposed to do in 1939? Dig in? Or the Red Army in 1941 — also dig in or retreat into interior? Why don't you actually search the web for Polish plans for start of hostilities. All that info is available and you can readily get it.

Since you don't seem to understand the main idea, I'll draw it in crayon for you:
Stalin shit his pants = low confidence in Red Army.


Yeah, Stalin got scared of how easily Hitler defeated England and France, and in general did not want to get USSR involved in a European war. USSR was not ready for such war neither politically, economically and most importantly militarily.

Stalin giving orders to «encircle and destroy» the enemy = high confidence in Red Army.

What order was he supposed to give? Cut and Run?

The first is your interpretation. The second is a fact. You just keep digging a deeper and deeper hole for yourself.

You mean a trench?



Who said anything about Molotov being in Berlin on 22 June 1941? Let's take another look at my statement:

«Another: if Stalin shit his pants, what was Molotov doing in Berlin, making demands which were «crawling» into the german sphere of influence? If you are afraid of a lion, you don't throw stones at him. You keep a low profile and try to arm yourself. Yet Molotov is poking Germany.»

I don't see «22 June 1941» anywhere. You know when was Molotov in Berlin, right? (Hint: November 1940, when Stalin was apparently shitting his pants and he was displaying his fear by asking Hitler — through Molotov — to abandon Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland into the soviet sphere of influence).


Yeah — similar to what Chamberlain was doing in Germany. Everyone was trying to avoid another European war or get sucked into a conflict. After the defeat of England and France Stalin felt he had to appease the Fuhrer. You should actually read up on Soviet/German diplomacy of the time. I gave you a book by Gorodetsky — you can start with that.


If that's the best you can do, Rezun does not even need to try to defend his thesis — it is sufficient to let you guys speak, because you are doing a miserable job of it.

Did you read his books in English or Russian?

I don't know if you have noticed, but I managed to prove you are spouting rubbish using scholars like David Glantz and John Erickson, which are among the chief opponents of Rezun's thesis and that says a lot. As far as I'm concerned, I don't take cheek or advice from people who refuse to name their sources when their nonsense is questioned.

Actually all I saw is you taking a few very generalized quotes from Erickson, Glantz, and Seaton (who is very questionable character on the matter) — all out of context.


I entered this discussion hoping for an intelligent debate, but it seems I was wrong, so I'm not going to cheapen my existence by indulging this sillyness any further.

You are the one with the insults. You already managed to call me many things.

By the way the way the units fighting at Mtsensk belonged to 1th Guards Rifle Corps commanded by Lelushenko:

1. 4th and 6th Guard Rifle Divisions
2. 4th and 11th Tank Brigades
3 5th Airborne Corpes
4. Three Guards Mortar Battalions (Katushas), two artillery regiments
5. Tula Military School Detachment
6. 36th Motorcycle Regiment

Katukov commanded 4th tank brigade. 4th Tank Brigade was formed at Stalingrad in August/September of 1941 based on the 15th Tank Division, evacuated for refitting.
tankfront.ru/ussr/tbr/tbr004.html I assume you do read Russian. In that article it says how many tanks and of which kind were in the 4th Tank Brigade.
Panfilov
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#964
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  


I just re-read the few pages of passages in the «Road To Stalingrad» pages 232 to 237 and saw no such thing in Erickson's conclusions. In fact there are no conclusions as such. On the contrary he talks about various evacuation decisions and their implementation.



Lucky me I have a scanner. Follow the arrow and you will see that statement: «For all the superhuman effort of the evacuation (which even a minimum of forward planning would have made less critical) much remained and was overrun.»





And, btw, I already read Grand Delusion, thank you very much.




You are the one with the insults. You already managed to call me many things.


Who said anything about «insults»? In case you missed it, what I reproached you is your refusal to provide sources when questioned.

You are employing a very cheap tactic of argumentation which consists in making wild claims and refusing to back them up, put words in others' mouth, change the subject often when you don't like the outcome and casually dismissing anything which does not concur with your views. Such a tactic is utterly maddening for those subjected to it and leads to conflictual situations, because it is extremely hard for someone to keep his temper in such circumstances.
I also suspect you are doing this deliberately.
In your opening post, you have said that several statements of mine were not true, in other words you called me either a liar or an ignorant. While I admit I could be mistaken, I require evidence more solid than your esteemed opinion. When I asked you to provide it, you simply refused to do so. Frankly, I find this behaviour totally outrageous and worthy of more harsher words than what I already called you.
I'm not going to play along, so maybe you could be so kind as to bother someone else.
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#965
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Posted by Sentinel:

Lucky me I have a scanner. Follow the arrow and you will see that statement: «For all the superhuman effort of the evacuation (which even a minimum of forward planning would have made less critical) much remained and was overrun.»

Lucky you — with the scanner. So from a statement in Erickson you conclude what? That Stalin was planning to invade the world? I re-read the entire 5 pages in Erickcson and did not see Erickson making any conclusions of the sort. May be the local audience did...

Who said anything about «insults»? In case you missed it, what I reproached you is your refusal to provide sources when questioned.

Sources? Yours are wikipedia (primary), John Erickson «Road To Stalingrad», «Titans Clashed» by Glantz, and «Barbarossa» by Seaton. I am impressed.

You are employing a very cheap tactic of argumentation which consists in making wild claims and refusing to back them up, put words in others' mouth, change the subject often when you don't like the outcome and casually dismissing anything which does not concur with your views. Such a tactic is utterly maddening for those subjected to it and leads to conflictual situations, because it is extremely hard for someone to keep his temper in such circumstances.

You have a very short temper. Apparently.


I also suspect you are doing this deliberately.
In your opening post, you have said that several statements of mine were not true, in other words you called me either a liar or an ignorant.


I did what? Where?

While I admit I could be mistaken, I require evidence more solid than your esteemed opinion. When I asked you to provide it, you simply refused to do so. Frankly, I find this behaviour totally outrageous and worthy of more harsher words than what I already called you.
I'm not going to play along, so maybe you could be so kind as to bother someone else.


I have read enough on WWII, in English and Russian, to not quote every little thing I say. I definitely don't use sources the way you do.... taking a quote from a secondary source and making an entire theory off it. That's a favorite tool of a revisionist.
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#970
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
Panfilov:
Sources? Yours are wikipedia (primary), John Erickson «Road To Stalingrad», «Titans Clashed» by Glantz, and «Barbarossa» by Seaton. I am impressed.

Excuse me but claiming wikipedia as a 'source' is mauvais ton. Wikipedia is a huge cesspit of outdated and unverified information.
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#974
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
V_P wrote:
Panfilov:
Sources? Yours are wikipedia (primary), John Erickson «Road To Stalingrad», «Titans Clashed» by Glantz, and «Barbarossa» by Seaton. I am impressed.

Excuse me but claiming wikipedia as a 'source' is mauvais ton. Wikipedia is a huge cesspit of outdated and unverified information.


Excuse me, but I used wikipedia 3 times. On the other had, I used «Titans clashed» 3 times, Seaton's Barbarossa «4 times», «Stumbling Colossus» once, Glantz's «Battle for Leningrad» once, Road to Stalingrad once, De Launay «Grand Decisions» once.
Wikipedia makes 3 references out of a total of 14, which is only a percent of 22% and after he complained about its reliability, I abandoned using wiki. On what grounds does Mr. Panfilov call wikipedia as my primary source?

When I used other sources than wiki, he contemptuously dismissed them as «taken out of context», despite that they clearly contradicted his claims that «the germans were not shocked by KV and T-34» or that «the germans did not have much trouble with T-34 and KV when encountered on the battlefield» (or maybe because of that). As to «being taken out of context», this is how quotations are made: in most situations, even in the vaunted «Grand Delusion», authors do not quote entire pages, but only paragraphs. Moreso, it would have been impossible for me to copy entire pages from the respective books, due to time and space constraints so I don't know how a reference of mine should have been in order not to be called «taken out of context». Maybe I should have taken a page out of Panfilov's book and not provide any reference whatsoever.

On the other hand, Panfilov simply refused to provide a source when I doubted some of his claims, refusal which is poor sport by any civilized standards, and I don't see you complaining about that.
Moreso, I notice that my accusation that he uses a dishonest tactic in order to simply piss me off wasn't actually denied by him. That's some food for thought.



Anyway, I understand what is going on, so let's cut to the chase. Mr. Potapov, this is your forum. You can even take a dump in it if this is what you like. But let me point it out one thing. Suvorov's theory has not «withered away», as your review would like everyone to believe. Quite the opposite, the controversy is still raging. Since 2000, there have been other books supporting the idea like Mikhail Meltyukov's Stalin Missed Chance, Albert Weeks talin's other war and other books and articles. Nor the idea that Stalin planned an invasion is confined strictly to Suvorov, which had been only the most vocal supporter of the theory. It is possible that someone might try to discredit such authors, just like it was attempted with Mr.Seaton, but that does not do the one making the attempt any favors.
In your review, you have expressed your hope that the reader would see the truth about Suvorov, etc. So I took a search on Amazon to see how his works are rated. There are 2 books of his available, Icebreaker and Chief Culprit.

Chief Culprit received 18 reviews: there were 13 five stars reviews, 4 four stars reviews and only 1 one star review. (As a side note, the 1 star review was discussed there and, in my opinion as a historian, did not come out looking good, professionally speaking, at least).

Icebreaker received 32 reviews: there were 27 five stars reviews, 1 four stars review, 1 three star review and 3 one star reviews.

Also, Albert Weeks' Stalin's other war, which supports many of Suvorov's thesis, received 7 reviews: 6 were five star reviews and 1 a four stars review.

By comparison, Gorodetsky's «Grand Delusion», which had been described in this discussion as «the best book on soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941» received 12 reviews: there were 4 five stars reviews, 3 four stars reviews, 1 two stars review and 4 one star review.

Basically, Gorodetsky's work received a rating of about 60% while Suvorov's and Weeks' rating are around 90% or more. There is a reason for that and I would say that the obnoxious attitude of the anti-rezunists towards anyone who does not fully agree with them does play a part.

It seems that all the anti-Suvorov reviews do a very poor job at persuasion. That is because throwing vitriol at the opposite side isn't exactly the best method of arguing if you want to convince those who weren't already rabid fans of the anti-Suvorov opinions and implying that everyone who does not see things your way is a clueless idiot does not actually help. And neither arguing dishonestly.

I was under the impression that battlefield.ru is a serious historical site about WW2, not «let's all bash Suvorov and anyone who does not agree can fuck off». If it's the latter, I'll have to excuse myself, but I do have to say that someone surrounding himself with cheerleaders does not actually pay off.

Have a good day.
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#977
Re:Несостоявшийся историк 1 Год, 1 Месяц назад  
By Sentinel:

On what grounds does Mr. Panfilov call wikipedia as my primary source?

You said and I quote:

Beg your pardon, I've read some studies which proved that wiki is just as accurate as Encyclopedia Britannica. Certainly, wiki is not a good source for an academic research, but for a discussion on a message board is more than adequate.

And made my appropriate conclusions about your exact usage of sources.

By comparison, Gorodetsky's «Grand Delusion», which had been described in this discussion as «the best book on soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941» received 12 reviews: there were 4 five stars reviews, 3 four stars reviews, 1 two stars review and 4 one star review.

There are in fact a lot of books on inter-European diplomacy and politics of the late 1930s in English, Russian, Polish, German, French and even Greek, Romanian, Ukranian, and Japanese. Gorodetsky is one of many. This particular history is a very favorite topic of study in many European countries, as you can imagine, and the amount of research done on this is enormous. In fact WWII is probably the most studied historical event in human history. These independent historians of different nationalities went through hundreds of millions of sources located in many different countries around the world to put together a picture of what and how it has transpired. If there was any type of a serious plan to begin invasion of Europe on July 2, 1941 by the Soviets it would have already been uncovered — but that's secondary. No historian of Hitler has EVER uncovered any evidence that Hitler was the «Icebreaker» of world revolution.

Gorodetsky's book is very boring and dry. Much history is boring.... and as a Ph.D. on these exact matters you should know that. Most of history does not have tales of wander-planes, wander-tanks, and wander-cannons. Neither is history some sort of conspiracy theory — especially that of WWII. Suvorov makes entire history of WWII about Stalin but unfortunately it is not so. It's a lot more complex.


It seems that all the anti-Suvorov reviews do a very poor job at persuasion. That is because throwing vitriol at the opposite side isn't exactly the best method of arguing if you want to convince those who weren't already rabid fans of the anti-Suvorov opinions and implying that everyone who does not see things your way is a clueless idiot does not actually help. And neither arguing dishonestly.

The problem with Suvorov is not what he says, or his theories, but the way he came to his conclusions. History, as you should know, is a science in itself. Well argumented historical research is one thing, even one which is not very comfortable to one's nationalistic sensitivities, and bad historical research is something else.

For example your usage of ONE sentence from Erickson. I am not sure what one very general sentence from Erickson proves exactly? That Soviet leadership was so confident that USSR would not be invaded that it did not have even basic pre-war evacuation plan for its strategic military industries? In fact Erickson does not even mean pre-war; it's just a very general statement and not an exact study on the prewar evacuation of Soviet industry. I can give you a few other answers to Erickson's «conclusion.» In fact I doubt Erickson himself had any sinister reasons to say what he did — like something on the order of covering up of aggressive Soviet pre-war plans. Erickson was not an «official» Soviet historian and his books were never printed in USSR, even though he did get access to lots of Soviet archives, from what I read, on the orders of Breznev himself. Erickson was not «covering-up» anything. What you did is called taking statements «out of context.»

Same with Glantz and the Soviet action at Mtsensk in September of 1941. Glantz, who is a true military historian — by the way, in this case did not really make any effort to describe to what has happened during that particular battle in his «Titans Clashed.» He only devoted two sentence to the entire incident. He did not look at the forces involved on both sides or provide a detailed study.

If you read about Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade action at Mtsensk you find out that in fact majority of his tanks were BTs, some as old as BT2s with double-turret machine gun. Yes, he did have a number of KVs and T-34s but these were not a majority. You can get this info in English from lets say: «Soviet Army Tank Commanders» — www.amazon.com/Red-Army-Tank-Commanders-Schiffer/dp/0887405819. If you read Russian there are a number of sources to the exact info used by the author, of the latter book, like Katukov's own biography. In Guderian, who describes, this action, if only briefly there is no break down of anything. For Guderian every time his armies encountered problems it was the fault of the dreaded T-34s.

This is not to devalue «Titans Clashed» but this was the nature of the book itself — a very general overview.

I was under the impression that battlefield.ru is a serious historical site about WW2, not «let's all bash Suvorov and anyone who does not agree can fuck off». If it's the latter, I'll have to excuse myself, but I do have to say that someone surrounding himself with cheerleaders does not actually pay off.

I think you expect people to agree with you. Unfortunately that is not the case.
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