COUNTERPOINT TO STALINGRAD. Operation Mars (November-December 1942) |
After enduring months of bitter and costly defensive combat at Stalingrad, on 19 November 1942, Red Army forces struck a massive blow against the hitherto triumphant German Army. To the Germans' utter consternation, within one week Soviet forces encircled German Sixth Army in the deadly Stalingrad cauldron. Ten weeks later, the army's tattered remnants surrendered, ending the most famous battle of the
History states the titanic Battle of Stalingrad altered the course of war on the German Eastern Front and set the Wehrmacht and German Reich on its path toward utter and humiliating defeat. History accorded enduring fame to the victors of Stalingrad. The victorious Red Army seemingly never again suffered strategic or significant operational defeat1. The architects of the Stalingrad victory entered the annals of military history as unvanquished heroes who led the subsequent Soviet march to victory. Foremost among them was Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the hero of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin.
History, however, has misinformed us. The muses of history are fickle. They record only what was reported and ignore what was not. The adage, «To the victors belong the spoils,» applies to history as well as war. As a spoil of war, history also exerts a powerful influence over future generations. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the case of Germany's war on the Eastern Front. The victorious Germans proudly recounted the triumphant course of the war to late 1942. Thereafter, the victorious Soviets proclaimed their martial feats, and few Germans disputed them.
The place names of 1941 and 1942 fame, such as Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk, and Kharkov, properly evoke images of German triumph, while the names Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Byelorussia, and Berlin resound as unqualified Soviet victories. These images, however, are deceptive and flawed. For example, despite the impressive German advances in 1941 and 1942, German Operations Barbarossa and Blau [Blue] failed, Moscow and Leningrad remained in Soviet hands, and catastrophic German defeats followed, which culminated in the destruction of the German Reich.
Likewise, the history of the later war years has misled us to an even greater extent by failing to qualify seemingly unending Soviet battlefield success. Understandably, the Soviets were quite reluctant to tarnish their record, and the Germans often avoided the unpleasantness by simply attributing defeat to a demented Hitler and overwhelming Soviet strength. The resulting Soviet combat record thus resembled a seamless, unblemished march to inevitable victory. This flawed historical mosaic has perverted the war's history by masking numerous Soviet failures and defeats, which punctuated the Red Army's admittedly victorious march. It has also elevated the reputations of certain victorious Soviet commanders such as G. K. Zhukov and I. S. Konev to almost superhuman proportions, covering up the fact that, after all, they too were human and, as such, demonstrated characteristic human weaknesses.
This article begins the process of correcting the historical record of this most terrible war by identifying the flaws and by placing those famous battles, which have already been recorded and extolled, in their proper context. This is an impartial process, for almost as much has been forgotten about the period of German victory before late 1942 as has been forgotten about the Soviet triumphant march after late 19422.
Soviet Operation Mars is the most glaring instance where the historiography of the
Today, sufficient German and Soviet archival materials are available to permit correction of this historical mistake and to commemorate properly the sacrifices of the half million Red Army soldiers and the many Germans who fell during the operation, a figure which exceeds the military death toll of the United States Armed Forces throughout the entire war.
In late September 1942, key Stavka political and military leaders formulated a strategy to reverse the fortunes of war4. Their plans reflected the bitter experiences of the prior 18 months of war and the military realities they confronted. During the tragic initial period of war in 1941, the ambitious German Operation Barbarossa had propelled German forces to the gates of Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov before stiffened Soviet resistance and the effects of the Soviet Union's vast territorial expanse combined to bring exhausted German forces to a halt. German overextension and a desperate Soviet counteroffensive inflicted unprecedented, but temporary, defeat on Blitzkrieg at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941. Despite subsequent Soviet successes in the harsh winter which followed, however, German forces remained menacingly close to the Soviet capital.
Undeterred by their Moscow setback and inspired by the disasterous defeat of twin Soviet offensives in May 1942 at Kharkov and in the Crimea, in June 1942 the German Army unleashed Operation Blau in an attempt to regain the strategic initiative and win the conflict. Replicating their ambitious 1941 operations, although on a lesser scale, in summer 1942 German forces plunged eastward across the endless steppes of southern Russia to the banks of the Volga River at Stalingrad and toward the
Marshal Zhukov played a significant role in September and October 1942 Stavka planning sessions5. This was so because he had earned Stalin's trust by proving to be a tenacious and often victorious fighter. A former cavalry officer, Zhukov had earned much of his reputation as a fighter in action against the Japanese in August and September 1939. Forces under his command had utterly routed Japanese forces at Khalhin Gol in eastern Mongolia, a defeat that later contributed to the critical Japanese decision to remain aloof from the
After beginning the war as Chief of the Red Army General Staff, Zhukov received field command and was instrumental in bloodying the German's nose in the terrible battles around Smolensk in July and August 1941. In September Stalin relieved Zhukov of his command along the Western axis and dispatched him to Leningrad, ostensibly because Zhukov disagreed with Stalin's disastrous decision to defend Kiev. After stabilizing
Soviet defenses around Leningrad, in October Stalin summoned Zhukov to Moscow, where he needed a fighter to halt the German juggernaut. Zhukov answered Stalin's call by planning and leading the victorious Soviet Moscow counteroffensives in winter 1942.
Subsequently, in spring and summer 1942, he commanded Soviet forces along the Moscow axis. While the Germans were advancing on Stalingrad, Zhukov orchestrated several offensives against German forces in the central sector of the front, including a major attack on the Rzhev salient in August, which was a virtual rehearsal for Operation Mars7.
Based on his own strategic analysis and personal combat experiences, Zhukov believed in a «northern» strategy for winning the war. Frustrated over his failure to destroy German forces at Moscow in winter
From his earlier combat experiences, Zhukov well understood that this would be no easy task. General Walter Model's German Ninth Army had erected strong defenses around the salient and had fortified all cities and towns along the salient's periphery, including the key cities of Rzhev, Belyi, and Sychevka. The Germans had fortified the rivers flanking the salient and had cleared timber from the main
Zhukov also realized that General Model would be a formidable opponent, for he too was a fighter. Model had delivered a stinging rebuff to Soviet forces in the region in winter 1941, and combat in 1942 provided Model's forces with a keen appreciation of literally every inch of terrain in the region. Nevertheless, Zhukov was convinced that his forces, together with the massive strategic reserves which the Stavka had assembled at
During the Stavka's deliberations, Zhukov emphasized Soviet force superiority in the decisive central sector of the front. Here the Soviet Kalinin and Western Fronts, supported by the Moscow Defense Zone, numbered almost 1,900,000 men with over 24,000 guns and mortars, 3,300 tanks, and 1,100 aircraft9. On the other hand, in the southern Soviet Union, the 3 Soviet fronts in the Stalingrad region fielded over 1 million men with about 15,000 guns and mortars, 1,400 tanks, and over 900 aircraft10. Admittedly, the Rumanian, Italian, and Hungarian forces deployed in the south added to German vulnerability, and their presence there undoubtedly improved Soviet chances for success. However, Zhukov argued, eradication of the German threat to Moscow would inevitably contribute to success in the south as well. Should either Soviet offensive falter, Stavka reserves could develop and exploit the other offensive11. Stalin accepted Zhukov's recommendations, for he too still seethed over previous failures to defeat German Army Group Center.
On the evening of 26 September, the Generalissimo ordered major strategic counteroffensives be conducted at both Rzhev and Stalingrad. Appropriately, Zhukov would command the former, and his contemporary, General A. M. Vasilevsky, would command the latter. Vasilevsky, then Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of Defense, was a penultimate staff officer and a protege of former Chief of the General Staff, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov. At the outbreak of war, Vasilevsky had been chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, and, because of his obvious talents, he rose from colonel to colonel general in only four years. His wartime accomplishments as key General Staff planner and «fireman» in key operational sectors had won Stalin's confidence and appointment in July 1942 as Chief of the General Staff. Vasilevsky's calm demeanor and keen intelligence tended to moderate both Stalin's and Zhukov's excesses12.
With Stalin's formal approval, the General Staff, Zhukov, and Vasilevsky planned the twin
The Stavka dispatched the directive for Operation Mars to the Western and Kalinin Fronts on
Army General M. A. Purkaev's Kalinin Front was to conduct its main attack south of Belyi with 41st Army and along the Luchesa River north of Belyi with 22nd Army, while 39th Army, at the northern extremity of the Rzhev salient, would launch a secondary assault southward across the Molodoi Tud River toward Olenino19. The crack Stalin 6th Volunteer Rifle Corps would spearhead 41st Army's attack. Once German defenses had been penetrated, 1st and 2nd Mechanized Corps would exploit eastward to link up west of Sychevka with 20th Army's cavalry-mechanized group. Kalinin Front's 22nd Army, spearheaded by 3rd Mechanized Corps, would advance eastward up the Luchesa River valley, pierce German defenses, assist in the capture of Belyi, and encircle German forces around Olenino in conjunction with 39th Army. After the main attacks had succeeded, other Soviet armies around the flaming circumference of the Rzhev salient would join the offensive, destroy German Ninth Army, and regroup to participate in Operation Jupiter20.
In Operation Jupiter, Western Front's heavily reinforced 5th and 33rd Armies, deployed astride the
The long delay in the launch of the operation provided more than adequate time for Zhukov and the front commanders to assemble their imposing host and prepare the troops for combat. As usual, to insure the secrecy of the operation, troops were notified of the attack only days before it commenced. Typical of last minute preparations was this order to the 20th Army's 8th Guards Rifle Corps:
To the commanders of 8th Guards Rifle Corps formations.20.11.42
…the corps orders:
Fully occupy
…
Eliminate squads and platoons made up of «nationals» [ethnic
During the day on 22.11.42 conduct study of the attack axes with command personnel….
…
Provide personnel with a chance for a good sleep and, without fail, feed [the troops] with warm food and distribute the required vodka norm before the attack…
…
Provide all personnel with a bath and a pair of clean clothes…
Obtain white camouflage overalls and felt boots…
8th Guards Rifle Corps chief of staff, Guards Colonel Posiakin
Chief of the corps' operation section, Guards Colonel Andrianov23
The plan for Operation Mars bore all the characteristics of a
Zhukov's offensive began early on 25 November simultaneously against the eastern, western, and northern flanks of the German Rzhev salient24. Preceded by vicious artillery preparation, infantry and supporting tanks of Western Front's 20th and 31st Armies' struck hard at the defensive positions of German XXXIX Panzer Corps along and north of the Vazuza and Osuga Rivers northeast of the vital German rail head of Sychevka. Although the Germans expected an attack soon, the assault caught the defenders at an awkward moment, when their 78th Infantry Division was in the midst of conducting a
North of the Osuga River, the German 102nd Infantry Division successfully repelled repeated assaults by 20,000 infantry and over 100 tanks of 3 Soviet 31st Army divisions26. Soviet infantry clad in winter white advanced in echelon, their ranks interspersed with supporting tanks. German artillery, machine guns, and small arms fire tore gaping holes in the ranks of the assaulting infantry as antitank weapons picked off the accompanying tanks. For three days and at a cost of more than half of their riflemen and most of their tanks,, the Soviets hurled themselves in vain at the 102nd Division's prepared defenses27. Faced with this determined resistance, the 31st Army's assault collapsed, and, despite Zhukov's and Konev's exhortations, it could not be revived. Three 20th Army rifle divisions attacking between the Vazuza and Osuga Rivers met the same grisly fate. Despite strong armored support, their attacks stalled after suffering frightful losses28. Undeterred by the initial failures, the carnage increased as Zhukov and Konev insisted the attacks continue to support operations further south.
To the south, along the banks of the frozen Vazuza River, a single rifle division of Major General N. I. Kiriukhin's 20th Army achieved signal, if limited success. Taking advantage of the Germans' temporary confusion, Major General G. D. Mukhin's 247th Rifle Division, supported by tank brigade of about 50 tanks, lunged across the frozen Vazuza River, tore through forward German positions, and seized 2 German fortified villages on the river's western bank29. Exploiting the opportunity, General Kiriukhin quickly moved Colonel P. F. Berestov's 331st Rifle Division across the river and into the breech. Fierce fighting raged all day in the rolling open country west of the river as Soviet infantry struggled to overcome pesky German village strong points and expand the bridgehead. It was critical they do so, for Konev and Kiriukhin planned to commit their second echelon 8th Guards Rifle Corps and their mobile group, the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, into the breech to enlarge the bridgehead and exploit the operation westward30. All day, exhorting, cursing, and cajoling, Zhukov, Konev, and Kiriukhin urged their men on. By day's end, although the bridgehead was still too small, Konev decided to accept the risk and ordered Kiriukhin's second echelon and mobile group to advance the next morning.
This decision, however, turned out to be premature and
The Soviet command also appreciated the gravity of the situation. On the night of
The defending Germans experienced the full impact of Kiriukhin's assault on 27 November. While German reserves from the 9th Panzer Division maneuvered into blocking positions along the open terrain either side of the critical
A German eyewitness account captured the ferocity of the action, writing that the commander of the 78th Infantry Division's 215th Grenadier Regiment:
…was ordered to gather all of the units in the threatened sector into one combat group under his command, to close the gap, and, while ignoring the enemy who had already broken through, to prevent further breakthroughs. In his sector, [he] was able to assemble around him, in a blocking position at Lopotok, the division training company and whatever assault guns and stragglers were available. As he was organizing them, about five cossack squadrons galloped down upon them, trying to break out to the southeast. Everyone who had a weapon, whether infantryman, artilleryman, and even the assault guns and a light battery, engaged them in direct fire. By chance, a Ju-88 was circling over the village, discovered the Russians, and joined in battle with its bombs and
A Soviet account laconically confirmed the terrible carnage:
The commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was not able to assign his divisions' penetration missions in timely fashion on 28 November and did not provide for their timely commitment into combat. Having received its mission in timely fashion and, while operating skillfully and decisively, two regiments of the 20th Cavalry Division successfully penetrated between enemy strong points, but, having been cut off from the main force, the third regiment was unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses.
Having received its penetration order two hours after the 20th Cavalry Division, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division attacked an already prepared and alerted enemy, fell under his concentrated
In two days of fierce fighting, the 5th Panzer Division had suffered over 500 casualties, and the 78th Infantry Division reported, «All units severely weakened and great losses in equipment and weapons.»36 The cost to the Russians was obviously higher, for the Germans counted at least 50 destroyed Russian tanks, and the
By nightfall on 28 November, it was clear to all that the Soviet attack had faltered. Although the bulk of Colonel Arman's tank corps and three of General Kriukov's cavalry divisions had reached the forests across the
There, in the Belyi and Luchesa River sectors along the western flank of the Rzhev salient, Major General F. G. Tarasov's 41st and Major General V. A. Iushkevich's 22nd Armies had made striking progress in the first three days of battle and appeared close to reaching deep into the defending Germans' rear area. Once they had done so, thought Zhukov, the temporary difficulties along the Vazuza River would become irrelevant.
The 90,000 men and over 300 tanks of General Tarasov's 41st Army struck at 0900 hours on 25 November after an artillery preparation had smashed German forward defenses south of the fortified town of Belyi38. Advancing in a driving snowstorm across the frozen, forested, and
Solomatin later described the difficult advance, writing:
There were no roads, which would permit free movement of transport vehicles. The enemy had destroyed all bridges during his withdrawal. The deep snow cover and poor visibility in the falling snow strongly inhibited movement. The corps had no special vehicles for clearing snowdrifts and constructing column routes. We employed T-34 tanks for that purpose. They traveled in echelon, one after the other, so as to blaze a trail for the infantry vehicles and the towed artillery. In some instances motorised infantry followed the tanks on foot, which exhausted them and limited any form of combat maneuver.
The absence of roads, the dense forest, and the poor visibility in snowfall made orientation on the ground difficult. The tank
Despite the difficulty encountered in keeping some sort of order during the advance through the forest depths, Solomatin's tank brigades succeeded in reaching the key communications road linking Belyi with the German rear area.
The German XXXXI Panzer Corps intelligence report that evening recognized the gravity of the situation, accurately noting:
The Red Army… broke through in the sector of the 352nd Grenadier Regiment…on a front of
The further news that «another 20 Red battalions and 100 tanks were attacking further north in the Lushesa valley,» prompted a German commander to note that, «The situation in the
Despite General Solomatin's seemingly dramatic success, the attack plans of General Tarasov's 41st Army almost immediately went awry. Although ordered to avoid a prolonged struggle for the city of Belyi, Tarasov was inexorably drawn to the enticing target. The success of the initial Soviet assault seemed to indicate that Belyi was available for the taking45. Drawn like a magnet to the city, Tarasov first committed Colonel N. O. Gruz's 150th Rifle Division against the city's southern defenses, and, when they did not prevail, he reinforced Gruz's division with a mechanized brigade from Solomatin's exploiting mechanized corps46. Despite Tarasov's exertions and fierce fighting on the southern approaches to the city, Belyi could not be taken.
The credit for defending Belyi belonged to the commander of German XXXXI Panzer Corps, Colonel General Joseph Harpe, who decided to hold the city and relied on fate, luck, and anticipated German operational reserves to save the situation in the German rear47. Harpe directed the infantry of his 246th Infantry Division to establish a strong point defense south of the city. He then requested and received a kampfgruppe each from Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland and 1st Panzer Division, which were located in reserve positions northeast and southwest of Belyi, respectively. Racing forward across the frozen
Meanwhile, an increasingly frustrated General Solomatin attempted to sever the crucial Belyi-Vladimirskoe road running northwest into Belyi, which was the only available German
Solomatin was correct. The fresh German forces were the advanced elements of a force, which General Harpe was frantically assembling to contain and, ultimately, defeat the Soviet offensive. Relying on 1st Panzer Division to hold the Belyi strong point and the thin defenses along the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, Harpe requested all available reserves from higher headquarters. General Alfred Model, the Ninth Army commander, and Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge, the Army Group Center commander, responded quickly by ordering the 12th, 20th, and 19th Panzer Divisions to march to the sound of the guns. To reach the battlefield, however, these divisions had to march long distances over difficult routes in the harshest of winter conditions. Until they arrived, both XXXXI Panzer Corps and Ninth Army's fate hung in the balance.
Model at Ninth Army had other worries. Although the situation along the Vazuza River seemed to be under control, further north his front lines along the Luchesa River had been breached, and his defensive positions along the Molodoi Tud River were under assault and seriously sagging. German headquarters across the front were also transfixed by the great battle playing out around Stalingrad. The knowledge that all was not well at Stalingrad lent urgency to their grim task52.
Model's growing concern was justified. Early on 25 November, General Iushkevich's 22nd Army, with over 50,000 men and 270 tanks of Major General M. E. Katukov's 3rd Mechanized Corps, assaulted eastward up the Luchesa River valley. Attacking along a narrow corridor flanked by forests and frozen swamps, Soviet forces tore a gaping hole through German defenses and drove German forces eastward up the valley. General Iushkevich's attack was spearheaded by Colonel I. V. Karpov's 238th Rifle Division and two regiments of Colonel M. F. Andriushenko's 185th Rifle Division, supported by a tank brigade of General Katukov's mechanized corps. The combined force routed a regiment of the German 86th Infantry Division and punctured the German front at the junction of the XXXXI Panzer Corps' 86th Infantry and the XXIII Army Corps' 110th Infantry Division. During the next two days Iushkevich committed Katukov's full corps and drove German forces further up the valley.
The German XXIII Army Corps responded by committing Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment into the fray to slow the Soviet advance53. Heavy fighting raged for possession of the key village of Starukhi as Soviet forces drove inexorably toward the
A German participant later recorded the ferocity of the fighting, stating, «It was indescribable, what the infantrymen, engineers, the artillerymen, and the forward observers had to endure in the snow and ice of the forward combat line. Alert units had to be formed from convoy and supply units to close some of the developing gaps.»55 Another remarked, «There were attacks everywhere!. Crises rose by the hours!.»56 Nevertheless, the German defenses bent but did not break.
The tense situation along the Luchesa River was only exacerbated by unrelenting Soviet pressure against the northern extremity of the German Rzhev salient. There, on a broad front along the Molodoi Tud River, on 25 November the 80,000 men and over 200 tanks of Major General A. I. Zygin's Soviet 39th Army launched Zhukov's secondary attack with three rifle divisions and several rifle brigades, supported by two tank brigades and three separate tank regiments57. Since Zygin's attack was intended to be secondary, he was unable to exploit several opportunities for success, which arose on the first day of combat58. Although Soviet forces achieved some initial success in the
By 30 November this struggle too had degenerated into a series of grinding Soviet attacks, which achieved only limited gains. The German XXIII Army Corps' defending 206th Infantry and 14th Motorised Divisions were forced to conduct some tactical withdrawals but, nevertheless, maintained a continuous defense line, which denied General Zygin's forces access to their objective, the
Zhukov, Konev, and Purkaev alternated between elation and frustration over the results of the first five days of operations. The Western Front's main attack in the Sychevka sector had clearly faltered. Although 20th Army's infantry had secured a foothold over the Vazuza River and its mobile forces occupied precarious positions astride the critical
Having failed to exploit their opportunities west of the
A German eyewitness of the costly breakout recorded that, at day's end, «The battlefield was spotted with dead and wounded, a view which the oldest veteran cannot forget.»61 The Soviet 6th Tank Corps commander reported, «Tens of our soldiers suffered heroic deaths in this heavy combat, among whom were the commanders of the 200th Tank Brigade and 6th Motorised Rifle Brigade… who died leading the attack.»62 The intense combat took its toll on the Germans, as described by a 5th Panzer Division participant, who wrote:
Again, a heavy day of fighting had come to an end. All enemy attacks had been repulsed. But there was no doubt that the limits of our soldiers'
Zhukov was bitterly disappointed. General Kiriukhin's 20th Army had lost over 30,000 men and 200 tanks in 5 days of vicious combat. Losses in the 31st Army were just as severe, and little had been gained by the effort. Even more disconcerting, on the west side of the salient, the 41st Army's seemingly certain victory soon degenerated into catastrophic rout, and 22nd Army soon faced frustrating stalemate.
South of Belyi, General Solomatin's worst fears materialized. Not only were the Germans able to hold on to Belyi, but they were also able to orchestrate an effective counterstroke. The situation began deteriorating after 1 December, after Solomatin had shortened his corps' front and gone on the defense. First, between 2 and 6 December, the German XXXXI Panzer Corps' 1st Panzer Division and the newly arrived 12th Panzer Division regained firm control of the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, cut off and destroyed Colonel Dremov's isolated 47th Mechanized Brigade northeast of Belyi, and began applying unremitting pressure to Solomatin's defense lines southeast of the city64. Even more devastating for the Soviets, the German XXX Army Corps, with the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, began concentrating south of the Soviet Belyi salient. It was no mean task, since every German movement was contested by the terrible weather conditions, the abysmal roads, and intense resistance by Soviet partisans65. Despite these difficulties, by 6 December XXX Corps units were in a position to strike back at the Soviet 41st Army. They did so on the morning of 7 December against the 41st Army's southern flank, while the 1st Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Fusilier Regiment attacked southward from Belyi.
In three days of intense fighting, the combined German force slashed through the 41st Army's rear area and encircled the bulk of Tarasov's army southeast of Belyi. The glorious Soviet thrust had degenerated into an inglorious trap. General Solomatin, who was assigned command of all encircled Soviet forces, did what he could to organize a breakout, but all initial attempts to escape failed. Abandoned by his army commander, Solomatin ordered the troops of his and Colonel Popov's 6th Rifle Corp to dig in, organize
Soviet progress further north in the Luchesa River valley promised no relief. Despite strenuous efforts, General Iushkevich's forces in that sector could achieve little more. Having lost about half of its initial manpower and even more of its tanks, his 22nd Army lacked the strength to expand its sizable penetration. Nor could the Germans eliminate it. Although intense fighting ebbed and flowed for days, the stalemate endured. Further north, General Zygin's 39th Army continued its slow progress at the northern apex of the Rzhev salient against stout German resistance with little prospect for significant victory.
Zhukov responded to the depressing news from the Belyi sector with characteristic resolution. Unwilling to admit defeat, he orchestrated a massive
The new act in the developing drama began playing out in the Vazuza River bridgehead on the morning of 11 December. At 1010 hours massed Soviet infantry from the 20th and 29th Armies, supported by all remaining infantry support tanks, resumed their attacks from and south of the Vazuza River bridgehead. Despite withering German fire, Konev and Kiriukhin committed the almost 350 tanks and 20,000 men of his new 5th and refurbished 6th Tank Corps into combat. So hastily organized was the attack that many of the new tanks had not received their coat of white camouflage paint. Attacking with abandon across a 4-kilometer sector into the teeth of reinforced German antitank defenses, the desperate assault cost Soviet 20th Army about 300 tanks lost in 2 days of incessant and deadly combat68. A Soviet 5th Tank Corps account captured the grim and futile nature of the combat:
A rocket rising into the air signaled the attack. All those around came to life. The cries of «Forward!» and «For the Fatherland!» resounded across the field. It was 1010 hours on 11 December 1942. The first to rush forward were the regiments of the 20th Army's 243rd and 247th Rifle Divisions. Soon, however, their forward ranks were forced to take cover against the heavy enemy fire. A fierce, bloody battle began, which lasted all day. The attack misfired almost along the entire extent of the penetration front. Then, the brigades of the 5th Tank Corps were committed into battle. They began literally to chew their way through the enemy defense. The tank assaults gave way to furious enemy counterattacks. Individual heights and the most key positions changed hands several times. The entire battlefield was covered with destroyed and burning tanks and smashed guns — both sides suffered heavy losses69.
Although the carnage was frightful in the attack sectors of both the 20th and 29th Armies, Zhukov and Konev urged their forces on. The assaults continued for three days before collapsing in utter exhaustion on 15 December. The German Ninth Army's situation report for 15 December recorded the last agonies of the Soviet 20th Army, stating:
…along the eastern front, the enemy has once again launched a
By that time, all from the lowliest private to Zhukov himself realized that defeat was at hand. If the carnage along the Vazuza River did not confirm that reality, then the fate of Solomatin's force at Belyi would.
The 41st Army's encircled force of about 40,000 men commanded by General Solomatin held out southeast of Belyi for as long as humanly possible. Finally, the absence of any support from the 41st Army, the unrelenting pressure by the four encircling German panzer divisions, and the dwindling logistical stocks forced Solomatin to act, lest his isolated force be entirely destroyed. Solomatin orchestrated his breakout on the night of
Even the twin catastrophic Soviet defeats along the Vazuza River and at Belyi did not totally destroy Zhukov's resolve, for, despite being thwarted on the flanks of the Rzhev salient, Zhukov continued to attack with the 39th Army in the north until
Zhukov conducted Operation Mars in characteristic fashion. The Soviet assaults were massive and unsparing in manpower and material. Discounting the harsh terrain and weather conditions, he relied on pressure across the entire front and simple maneuver by his powerful mechanized corps and tank corps to achieve victory. Neither did. Skillful German tactical defense by relatively small but tenacious combat groups, which exploited terrain and
Operation Mars cost the Red Army nearly half a million men killed, wounded, or captured. Individual Soviet combat units were decimated in the operation. The Soviet 20th Army lost 58,524 men out of its original strength of over 114,000 men72. General Solomatin's 1st Mechanized Corps lost 8,100 of its 12,000 men and all of its 220 tanks, and the accompanying 6th Stalin Rifle Corps lost over 20,000 of its 30,000 men73. At lower levels the cost was even higher. The 8th Guards Rifle Corp's 26th Guards Rifle Division emerged from combat with 500 of its over 7,000 combat infantrymen intact, while the 4,500 man 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades had only 27 and 110 «fighters,» respectively, available at the end of the operation74.
Soviet tank losses, correctly estimated by the Germans as around 1,700, were equally staggering, in as much as they exceeded the total number of tanks the Soviets initially committed in Operation Uranus at Stalingrad75. In Western armies losses such as these would have prompted the removal of senior commanders, if not worse. In the Red Army it did not, for when all was said and done, Zhukov fought, and the Red Army needed fighters.
Although far less severe than those of the Soviets, the Germans too suffered grievous losses in the operation, losses which they could ill afford given their smaller manpower pool and the catastrophe befalling them at Stalingrad. For example, the 1st Panzer Division suffered 1,793 casualties, and the 5th Panzer 1,640, while losses in the infantry divisions (the 78th, 246th, 86th, 110th, and 206th) along the Soviet main attack axes were even greater76. The overall Soviet casualty toll, however, was at least 10-fold greater that the total German loss of around 40,000 men.
Zhukov said little about the defeat on his memoirs, and what he did say was grossly distorted. He mentioned only the December operation, and, without revealing its code name, he called it simply a diversion for the Operation Uranus. Among the many thousands of Soviet memoirs and unit histories, only a handful mention the operation, and these do so without revealing its full scope. Even formerly classified accounts avoid covering the operation in its entirety. Archival materials, however, do cover the operation in greater detail, but only in selective sectors.
In assessing blame for the failure, none of the few available Soviet accounts mention the role of key commanders such as Zhukov or Konev. For example, General Getman, commander of the 6th Tank Corps, who was ill in November and did not participate in the attack, wrote:
The offensive was conducted against fortified positions occupied by enemy tank forces and in
Other formerly classified Soviet sources and archival materials candidly critiqued the problems, and German reports echoed those critiques. A 15 December German Ninth Army report judged that the Russian operation had sustained a heavy defeat and «bled itself out,» adding:
The enemy leadership, which demonstrated skill and adaptability in the preparation and initial implementation of the offensive,.. once again displayed its old weaknesses as the operation progressed. Indeed, the enemy has learned much, but he has again shown himself to be unable to exploit critical unfavorable situations. The picture repeats itself when operations, which began with great intent and local successes, degenerated into senseless, wild hammering at fixed
The manner in which Operation Mars was fought and the carnage the operation produced has few parallels in the later war years. In its grisly form, its closest peer was the famous Soviet frontal assault on the Zeelow Heights during the April 1945 Berlin operation. Not coincidentally, it too was orchestrated by Zhukov. Unlike the case in 1942, however, the victorious conclusion of the Berlin operation required no alteration of the historical record to preserve Soviet pride or commanders' reputations.
The legacy of Operation Mars was silence. Stalin and history mandated that Vasilevsky's feat at Stalingrad remained unblemished by the Rzhev failure. Stalin recognized Zhukov's greatest quality — that he fought — and, at this stage of the war and later, Stalin needed fighters. Therefore, Zhukov's reputation remained intact. Stalin and Soviet history mandated that he shares credit with Vasilevsky for the Stalingrad victory. Zhukov gained a measure of revenge over German Army Group Center at Kursk in summer 1943 and in Byelorussia in summer 1944. Ironically, however, it would be Vasilevsky who, as key Stavka planner, would play an instrumental role in finally crushing that German Army Group in East Prussia in January 1945. Such is the fickleness of history.
Soviet military history ignored other notable Soviet defeats during the later war years. Among those notable operations, which, like Mars, endured obscurity and silence, were the failed Soviet Central Front offensive of
2. For a partial listing of forgotten operations, see, David M. Glantz, «The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the
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3. Other glaring instances of flaws in the historical record during the period 1943 through 1945 include the failed Soviet Central Front offensive westward from Kursk in
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4. Existing Soviet accounts, including Zhukov's memoirs, obfuscate when Operation Uranus was planned by stating that planning for the Stalingrad and associated operations occurred in late October and early November. It is now clear that both Operation Mars and Uranus were planned in late September.
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5. Zhukov's memoirs distort both the calendar of events in fall 1942 and his role in and the course of Operation Mars. He mentions the operation but covers up its timing, purpose, course, and consequences. For an accurate account of Zhukov's complete wartime itinerary, including the vital period of fall 1942, see S. I. Isaev, Vekhi frontovogo puti [Landmarks of a front path], VIZh, No. 10 (October 1991),
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6. Zhukov's force of over 57,000 men lost over 23,000 in the Khalhin Gol operation, including nearly 9,000 dead and missing. For details see G. F. Krivosheev, Grif sektretnosti niat: poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh, i voennykh konfliktakh [Classification secret removed: losses of the armed forces of the USSR in wars, military actions, and military conflicts], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993),
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7. The
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8. At the beginning of war, Zhukov had advocated a «southern» strategy be adopted, in which the Red Army would commit its most powerful forces in the south where strategic decision could be reached. This strategy reflected Zhukov's prior service in the Kiev Special Military District and his role in drafting prewar Soviet defense plans while he was serving as Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov converted to a «northern» strategy after his experiences at Moscow in winter
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9. The forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, together with the Moscow Defense Zone, comprised 31 percent of the manpower, 32 percent of the artillery, almost 50 percent of the armor, and over 35 percent of the total Soviet Armed Forces' strength. These forces were concentrated along only 17 percent of the overall front.
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10. These Soviet strength figures appear in A. A. Grechko, chief ed., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny
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11. Stavka reserves available to Zhukov's two fronts included an imposing array of tank, mechanized, and cavalry corps (the 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Tank, the 1st, 2d, and 3d Mechanized, and the 2d Guards Cavalry), the superbly refitted tank army of Lieutenant General P. S. Rybalko, then in Western Front reserve west of Kaluga, the 2d Guards Army and associated 2d Guards Mechanized Corps in the process of forming in the Tambov region midway between Moscow and Stalingrad; the 2d Reserve Army in the Vologda region; the 3d Reserve Army near Kalinin; and the 10th Reserve Army in the Volga Military District. While the three reserve armies would not be fit to take the field until late November and December, the Stavka considered them capable of supporting either Operation Mars or Uranus. The most ready of the armies, Lieutenant General R. Y. Malinovsky's powerful 2d Guards, was positioned to participate in the later stages of either operation. In addition, the Stavka had the refitted 6th Mechanized Corps in the Moscow Defense Zone, the fresh 7th and 24th Tank Corps in reserve in the south, as well as the 2d and 23d Tank Corps, which was assigned to the Volga Military District near Stalingrad. See Boevoi sostav sovetskoi armii, chast 2 [Combat composition of the Soviet Army, Part 2], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972). Classified secret, but now declassified. Prepared by the General Staff's Military-scientific Directorate.
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12. Vasilevsky remained one of Stalin's most trusted generals and advisers throughout the war. He completed the war as Stalin's theater commander in the Far East, where in August 1945 he organized and led the Soviet offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria. In terms of his performance, Vasilevsky emerged from the war as the Soviet Union's finest general, a fact which history has also tended to obscure. As was the custom, all Stavka members participated in the planning of both operations. As Deputy Supreme Commander, Zhukov did so as well, which later permitted him to share in the glory of the Stalingrad victory.
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13. The Soviet 5th Army consisted of 6 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 2 tank brigades, and 9 artillery regiments, while the 33d Army included the 7th Guards Rifle Corps, 8 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, a ski brigade, 3 tank brigades, and 5 artillery regiments. Both armies were far stronger than the other front armies, except the armies conducting the main attacks in Operation Mars. See Boevoi sostav,
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14. The Soviets understood that two Rumanian armies and a portion of German Fourth Panzer Army was supporting German Sixth Army operations around Stalingrad.
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15. Ultimately, Operation Saturn was truncated into Operation Little Saturn because German resistance at Stalingrad was stronger than anticipated. In Operation Little Saturn, the Stavka sought to destroy Italian and German forces along the Don River rather than reach deep to Rostov on the Sea of Azov.
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16. For the contents of the Western Front directive, see Tsentral'nyi arkhiv ministerstva oborony {Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], abbreviated TsAMO, Fond 386, Opis 8583, Ed. Khr. [individual custody] 144, List [page] 8. All archival references hereafter cited as TsAMO, with appropriate fond (F.), opis (Op.), delo (D.), and page (L.).
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17. Late on 26 September, the Stavka planners adjourned their sessions and returned to their respective front sectors to coordinate planning with front commanders and staffs. After surveying the latest conditions in the south, Zhukov intended to rejoined his Western and Kalinin Fronts on 12 October, the initial date set for the launch of Operation Mars. However, bad weather delayed the preparations for Mars, and, instead of rejoining his fronts, on 12 October Zhukov returned to Moscow to finalize plans for the operation's first phase, now rescheduled for 28 October. On 21 October, while Zhukov traveled to the Kalinin Front to finalize attack preparations, the General Staff prepared final orders and dispatched them to the respective fronts.
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18. For a full explanation of the Soviet operational concept, see «Vvod v proryv konno-mekhanizirovannykh grupp» [Introduction into the penetration of a cavalry-mechanized group], Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta voiny, No. 9 (noiabr'-dekabr' 1943 g.) [Collections of materials for the study of war experience, No.
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19. For a description of the 41st Army's mission within the context of Kalinin Front operations, see M. D. Solomatin, Krasnogradtsy [The men of Krasnograd] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963),
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20. While no Soviet documents refer specifically to Operation Jupiter, Soviet force concentrations clearly indicate the Stavka intended to conduct the
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21. No Soviet sources, open or classified, mention specific plans for Operation Jupiter. German Ninth Army records, however, document the major
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22. Stavka support for the Western and Kalinin Fronts included 31 tank brigades and 12 tank regiments, totaling 2,352 tanks, over 54 artillery regiments, 30 guards mortar battalions, and 23 antitank regiments with almost 10,000 guns and mortars, and 20 separate engineer and sapper battalions. This support included one of the newly fielded separate heavy guards mortar regiments (heavy Katiushas or «Stalin organs») and 18 separate heavy guards mortar battalions. See Boevoi sostav,
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23. «Prikazy 8Gv SK,
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24. For offensive details, see SMPIOV, No. 9,
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25. For German accounts of the operation along the Vazuza River, see H. Grossman, Rzhev: The Cornerstone of the Eastern Front, translated from the German Rshew: Eckpfeiler der Ostefront, (Freidberg, 1980), and Anton Detlev von Plato, Die Geschichte der 5. Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945, (Regensburg: Walhalla u. Praetoria Verlg KG Geog Zwickenpflug, 1978),
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26. The 31st Army led its attack with the 88th, 336th, and 239th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 332d and 145th Tank Brigades. The defending Germans decimated both tank brigades in three days of battle and inflicted huge losses on the Soviet rifle divisions.
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27. The story of the German 102d Infantry Division, in particular, the intelligence situation before the operation, is found in David Kahn, «An Intelligence Case History: The Defense of Osuga, 1942,» Aerospace Historian, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter/December 1981),
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28. In the sector between the Osuga and Vazuza Rivers, the German 102d Infantry Division's 195th Infantry Regiment defeated the Soviet 326th, 42d Guards, and 251st Rifle Divisions, which were supported by the 25th and 93d Tank Brigades.
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29. Mukhin's division was supported by the 80th and 240th Tank Brigades.
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30. The second echelon 8th Guards Rifle Corps consisted of the 26th Guards Rifle Division, the 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades, and the 11th and 18th Tank Brigades. Its mission was to expand the bridgehead and facilitate the exploitation by the Soviet mobile group. In addition, the 20th Army had the 1st Guards Motorised Rifle Division and the 31st Tank Brigade in army reserve. The mobile group was, in reality, a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of the 6th Tank and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps. Mobile groups, the forerunners of the modern operational maneuver group (OMG), had the specific mission of conducting an operational exploitation of the tactical penetration.
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31. A Soviet
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32. Arman's 22d and 20th Tank Brigades and 6th Motorised Rifle Brigade made it across the road, but with heavy losses, while his 100th Tank Brigade remained in the bridgehead, stopped by interlocking German strong points.
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33. Elements of Kriukov's 2d and 3d Guards Cavalry Divisions and his entire 20th Cavalry Division made it across the road. His 4th Guards Cavalry Division and corps headquarters did not.
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34. See Grossman, 45.
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35. SMPIOV, No. 9, 146.
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36. Grossman, 44 and von Plato,
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37. The immense traffic jam along the Vazuza River also delayed the forward deployment of supporting artillery.
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38. For details on the Soviet offensive in the Belyi sector, see M. D. Solomatin, Krasnogradtsy [The men of Krasnograd], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), "Report by the 3d Air Army Representative with the 1st MC During Operation «Mars,» TsAMO, F. 311, Op. 311, D. 24, LL.
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39. Popov's rifle corps consisted of the 150th Rifle Division and the 74th, 75th, 78th, and 91st Rifle Brigades, and Solomatin's corps, the 65th and 219th Tank and the 19th, 35th, and 37th Mechanized Brigades.
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40. Solomatin's corps numbered 10 heavy KV, 119 medium T-34, and 95 light T-70 tanks, See the corps'
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41. Popov's infantry accompanied Solomatin's advance, but, since it lagged behind the armor, it made seizure of the Belyi-Vladiirskoe road more difficult.
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42. Solomatin,
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43. Rolf O. G. Stoves, 1.
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44. Ibid.
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45. The initial Soviet assault routed a regiment of the German 246th Infantry Division. Tarasov believed few German reserves were available to defend the city. Moreover, since Belyi had held out during and since the Soviet Winter offensive of
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46. Gruz's division was reinforced, first, by Solomatin's 19th Mechanized Brigade and, subsequently, by the 91st Rifle Brigade.
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47. For details on German actions in the Belyi sector, see Grossman, Rzhev, and Rolf O. G. Stoves, 1.
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48. Group von Weitersheim consisted of the 1st Panzer Division's 113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and Group Kassnitz of Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division's Fusilier Regiment.
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49. The Belyi-Vladimirskoe road was the only German
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50. The 47th and 48th Mechanized Brigades were in army reserve, each with a regiment of 39 tanks.
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51. In his memoirs, Nastupala grozhaia bronia [Threatening armor attacks], (Kiev: Politicheskoi literatury Ukrainy, 1981), 38, Dremov notes only that his brigade took part in «an unsuccessful operation near Belyi.»
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52. For additional details on the German Ninth Army's defense and detailed intelligence information on Soviet forces throughout the operation, see «Tatigkeitsbericht der Abteilung Ic/A.O.» dated 1 July-3 Dec 1942, AOK 9, 27970/6 in National Archives (NAM) microfim series NAM T-312, Roll 304. Daily operational and intelligence maps accompany these reports.
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53. Grossdeutschland's Grenadier Regiment fielded forward a battalion at a time after helping repulse the Soviet assault further north. Details on Soviet operations in the Luchesa River valley are sketchy. See M. E. Katukov, Na ostrie glavnogo udara [At the point of the main attack], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), which, although it admits the operation took place, says little about its conduct. Memoirs by brigade commanders Babadzhanian and Dragunsky are little better. The records of the Ninth Army and the Grossdeutschland Division provide the most detailed and accurate account and confirm which Soviet units took part in the action.
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54. During this period General Iushkevich committed his 114th Rifle Brigade and 39th Tank Regiment from his army reserve. When these forces proved inadequate to the task, he began shifting rifle regiments into battle from other army sectors. The Germans, however, matched these piecemeal reinforcements with just enough strength to hold Iushkevich's army at bay but not enough to close the breech.
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55. Grossman, 54.
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56. Ibid.
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57. General Zygin's 39th Army assaulted along the Molodoi Tud with the 373d, 135th, and 158th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 28th and 81st Tank Brigades. He attacked on the flanks with four rifle brigades, the 100th and 117th on the right and the 136th and 101st on the left, supported by 28th and 29th Tank Regiments. For the few Soviet details see, V. P. Boiko, S dumoi o Rodine [With thoughts about the Homeland], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979) and N. M. Khlebnikov, Pod grokhot soten baterei [Under the thunder of hundreds of batteries], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979). The former was the commander of the 28th Tank Brigade and the latter was the 39th Army chief of artillery.
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58. The 100th Rifle Brigade broke through the German 253d Infantry Division's defenses southwest of Molodoi Tud city and advanced 5 kilometers into the German rear. A skillful counterattack by two battalions from Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment thwarted the Soviet advance, which Zygin was unable to reinforce. Thereafter, Grossdeutschland's two battalions speedily regrouped to meet the Soviet attack in the Luchesa River valley.
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59. Getman,
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60. For details of the 20th Cavalry Division's «raid» through the German rear, see A. I. Sekretov, Gvardeiskaia postup' (boevoi put' 17-i Mozyrskoi Krasnoznamennoi ordena Lenina, Suvorova i Kutuzova kavaleriiskoi divizii, podwhefnoi Tadzhikistnu, v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny
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61. von Plato, 250.
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62. Getman, 74.
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63. von Plato, 251.
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64. Solomatin,
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65. The German Ninth Army's records confirm the interdiction efforts by Soviet partisans, which significantly slowed the 20th Panzer Division's advance.
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66. See Solomatin,
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67. See Getman, 74, who states that his 6th Tank Corps' strength had increased to 100 tanks by 11 December, and A. D. Kochetkov, Dvinskiii tankovyi: boevoi put'5-go tankovogo dvinskogo korpusa [The Dvina Tank: the combat path of the 5th Dvina Tank Corps], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989). The latter provides detail on the tank corps' strength and its role in the December operation. It tracks well with 5th Tank Corps' archival documents.
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68. See combat reports in the 5th Tank Corps archival files at TsAMO, F. 3404, Op. 1, D. 9, 10, and 259, which include records of daily actions and losses from
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69. Kochetkov, 11.
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70. «Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr 140,» Armeeoberkommando 9, Ic/A.)., Nr. 3291/geh., A. H. Qu., den 15 Dezember1942. in National Archive Microfim [NAM] series T-312, Roll 304.
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71. TsAMO, F. 3424, Op. 1, D. 2, L.. 36.
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72. Ibid., F. 373, Op. 6631, D. 56, L.
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73. Ibid., F. 3424, Op. 1, D. 2, LL.
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74. Ibid., F. 825, Op. 1, D. 32, LL.
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75. The casualty tally in individual Soviet formations was equally shocking. In its
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76. von Plato, 256 and Stoves, 408.
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77. A. L. Getman, Tanki idut na Berlin (1941-1945) [The tanks advance on Berlin (1941-1945)], (Moscow: «Nauka,» 1973), 76.
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78. "Feindachrichtenblatt Nr. 140.
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Author: David M. Glantz